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UNITED STATES HOUSE ELECTIONS POST-­CITIZENS UNITED: THE INFLUENCE OF  
UNBRIDLED SPENDING 
Laura Gaffey 
 
Abstract: After the Citizens United decision in 2010 allowed corporations and unions to spend freely in 
elections, much media attention was given to the influence of unlimited and undisclosed donations 
during the 2010 midterm elections. This research attempts to determine the impact of increased outside 
spending by super PACs and other groups post-­Citizens United by comparing United States House races 
in 2006 and 2010. The analysis controls for other factors that influence election outcomes in order to 
determine the influence of outside spending, confirming that outside money did have a small measurable 
effect in both elections when spent to support challengers. This study reveals the difficulties of compiling 
precise data on outside spending in elections, especially for spending that is not express advocacy.  
Additionally, the findings demonstrate that challengers see a greater measurable effect of outside 
expenditures, a finding consistent with previous research.  
INTRODUCTION 
 Political scientists have studied the influence of campaign spending on election 
outcomes throughout the years, with a consensus that campaign spending does impact results 
E\LQFUHDVLQJWKHVSHQGHU·VOLNHOLKRRGRIYLFWRU\. However, campaign finance law has evolved 
greatly in the last decade, and many studies have yet to be repeated in this changed 
environment. The landmark Supreme Court decision in the case of Citizens United v. FEC in 2010 
altered the landscape of campaign finance, allowing corporations and unions to spend 
unlimited amounts in political campaigns. This decision, along with several others, has 
transformed campaign finance and given much more freedom and influence to outside groups 
who spend on behalf of an issue, party, or candidate. The influence of this influx of outside 
spending in political campaigns has yet to be studied empirically, despite a media focus on the 
SRZHURIQHZRXWVLGHJURXSV·VSHQGLQJLQWKHPLGWHUPHOHFWLRQ  
 This study will focus on the impact of outside group independent expenditures in the 
2006 and 2010 midterm elections, in an effort to assess the influence of increasing levels of 
outside spending in United States House of Representatives elections. Have these changes in 
campaign finance law impacted how money works in House elections? Does increased outside 
spending in House races affect election outcomes? Does the impact of outside spending vary 
between challengers and incumbents? Media reports focusing on the impact of Citizens United 
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have made many claims about the influence of powerful outside groups on the 2010 midterm 
elections, but has the impact of outside spending been overstated? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Many studies have examined the effect of campaign expenditures on election results 
throughout the years, with varying results. Though scholars agree that campaign expenditures 
do influence election results, they debate to what degree and for what types of candidates. A 
broad theme within the literature has focused on the different effects of campaign expenditures 
for challengers and incumbents in U.S. House races.1  Gary Jacobson found that challenger 
spending has a more substantial impact on results. For challengers, campaign spending has a 
bigger impact because they have more to gain;; for instance, they are buying name recognition 
that the incumbent already has.2 Incumbents spend at higher levels when they are more 
seriously challenged. For this reason, incumbent spending can even have a negative 
relationship with election results.  However, Green and Krasno argue that the impact of 
incumbent spending was understated by Jacobson, so their study included a variable measuring 
FKDOOHQJHU·VSROLWLFDOTXDOLW\LQDQDWWHPSWWRHTXDOL]HWKHHIIHFWRILQFXPEHQWVSHQGLQJ They 
found that incumbent spending was more influential than Jacobson demonstrated and that the 
FKDOOHQJHU·VSROLWLFDOTXDOLW\LQIOXHQFHGWKH share of the vote received by the challenger.3 
 Various scholars have attempted to refine the model for assessing the impact of 
expenditures in elections. Different methods include measuring challenger political quality, 
controlling for diminishing marginal utility by squaring expenditures, and measuring the 
varying impact of spending at different times in the election cycle.4 These authors address the 
difficulty of measuring the true impact of campaign spending due to the interactions between 
variables. Because other variables included in these models all impact the ability of candidates, 
and especially challengers, to raise money, it is more difficult to measure the impact of 
candidate expenditures.5 Challengers are not well equipped to raise money to counter increased 
spending by incumbents, which also skews the impact of spending.6 While these authors 
concede that it is difficult to accurately measure the impact of campaign expenditures, they 
                                               
1 Green and Krasno 1988;; Jacobson 1978;; Jacobson 1990;; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994. 
2 Jacobson 1978. 
3 Green and Krasno 1988. 
4 Abramowitz 1991;; Green and Krasno 1988;; Grier 1989;; Jacobson 1990;; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994.  
5 Abramowitz 1991;; Grier 1989. 
6 Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994. 
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agree that spending does effect election outcomes by increasing the vote share of the spender 
and that the strength of its impact varies between challengers and incumbents.  
Campaign Finance Law 
 In order to understand the evolution of campaign finance law, several definitions are 
necessary. The two different types of outside expenditures regulated by the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) are independent expenditures and electioneering communications. 
Independent expenditures include a variety of forms of campaign activity that explicitly call for 
election or defeat of a political candidate (known as express advocacy ads) and must be 
uncoordinated with official campaigns. However, electioneering communications only include 
broadcast advertisements that are aired during a specific pre-­election window (within 60 days 
of a general election or 30 days of a primary).  Electioneering communications may discuss 
candidates, but do not explicitly call for election or defeat. They also include issue 
advertisements.7  
 Since the aforementioned studies were completed, campaign finance law has changed 
drastically. The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), often referred to as the McCain-­
Feingold Act, banned national parties, federal candidates, and officeholders from raising soft 
money or unlimited contributioQVWRSDUW\FRPPLWWHHVIRU´SDUW\-­EXLOGLQJµDFWLYLWLHV, increased 
most contribution limits, and attempted to restrict issue advertising by more narrowly defining 
electioneering communications. Since BCRA restructured campaign finance, several court cases 
have reinterpreted the law. In 2007, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC removed the restrictions that 
prohibited 501(c)4 advocacy organizations from sponsoring electioneering communications.8 
Then, in 2010, the decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC said that contributions made to groups that 
make only independent expenditures and do not contribute directly to candidates or parties 
cannot be limited.9 This change allowed major donors to fund independent expenditures in 
unlimited amounts through certain groups.  
Outside Spending 
 Despite changes in campaign finance laws, outside spending has remained present in 
elections, taking different forms and being sponsored by different types of groups. Before 
                                               
7 U.S. Congress 2011. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Briffault 2010;; U.S Congress 2011. 
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BCRA, most outside money took the form of unlimited contributions to political parties, or soft 
money.10 Despite this ban, party fundraising has continued to increase in the form of hard 
money contributions.11 In elections post-­BCRA, 527 groups, a type of advocacy group that 
focuses on issue advocacy and voter mobilization, spent actively;; the primary purpose of these 
groups is to influence elections, and they are subject to donor disclosure requirements.12 An 
examination of the 2004 elections, the first post-­BCRA, reveals that corporations gave less 
money than they had in the past, but 527 groups gradually became more active and did spend 
on behalf of candidates.13 In the 2006 elections, 527 groups still spent actively, but at a reduced 
level from 2004. Due to changing FEC regulations, new groups such as 501(c) organizations 
became more active in 2006.14 501(c) organizations do not have the primary purpose of 
influencing elections, but their purpose can be another form of political action such as lobbying. 
They are not subject to donor disclosure requirements, unless a donor specifically allocates their 
contribution for electioneering.15 In the 2008 elections, 501(c) organizations spent three times the 
amount they had in 2004 or 2006. In 2004, the majority of outside spending came from 527 
groups, who spent only half of what they spent in 2004 in 2008.16 As campaign finance laws and 
regulations evolve, the methods used by outside groups to influence elections also continue to 
change. 
 In 2010, the widely publicized decision in Citizens United v. FEC removed the BCRA 
prohibition on corporate and union funding of independent expenditures and electioneering 
communications from general treasury funds.17 This decision, along with the decision in 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, led to the formation of a new type of outside group ² Super PACs. Super 
PACs are political action committees (PACs) that make only independent expenditures and no 
direct contributions to political committees. These groups can accept unlimited contributions 
from individuals, corporations, and unions.18 While Citizens United did remove spending 
restrictions, the decision upheld much of the disclosure laws included in BCRA, due to the 
                                               
10 U.S. Congress 2011. 
11 Franz 2008;; U.S. Congress 2011. 
12 Briffault 2010. 
13 Johnston 2006. 
14 Weissman and Ryan 2007. 
15 Briffault 2010. 
16 Weissman 2009. 
17 U.S. Congress 2011. 
18 Toner and Trainer 2011;; U.S. Congress 2011. 
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importance placed on transparency, accountability, and voter information.19 Registered Super 
PACs are required to disclose to the FEC both their contributions and expenditures, but 527s 
and 501(c) organizations must only disclose their independent expenditures and electioneering 
communications. Because many corporation and union funds are given through an 
intermediary, such as a 510(c) organization, their contributions are not disclosed.20  
2010 Midterm Elections 
 The 2010 midterm elections were the first post-­Citizens United, and the initial analyses 
examine the raw numbers of outside spending. In 2010, non-­party independent expenditures 
and electioneering communications increased by 130% from 2008 to $280 million, and 70 new 
Super PACs were formed and spent $84.6 million.21 Initially, these numbers would seem to 
indicate a new importance of outside spending after several court decisions deregulated 
campaign finance. In 2010, the advertisement totals for U.S. House races increased 26%, but 
interest groups still only sponsored 12% of ads.22  
 However, all the new spending in the 2010 midterms may not be due to just outside 
spending.23 Candidate, party, and outside spending all increased in 2010, but party spending 
became less significant. In spite of this, not all of the biggest spenders won their elections, 
indicating that the impact of campaign expenditures is limited.24 On the other hand, an analysis 
by political scientist Michael Cornfield asserts that while party and candidate spending was 
relatively balanced between the two parties, outside spending contributions heavily favored 
Republican candidates. Therefore, he claims that because Republicans won more seats than 
forecasted, outside spending significantly helped Republicans win races in 2010.25 Another 
analysis found that while there was an increase in express advocacy ads sponsored by outside 
groups, their influence has been overstated in the media, as the majority of spending is still by 
candidates and parties.26 Yet none of these analyses includes a full study of the impact of 
outside spending in 2010 that controls for other factors that influence elections. Therefore, 
                                               
19 Briffault 2010. 
20 Briffault 2010, U.S. Congress 2011. 
21 U.S. Congress 2011. 
22 Franz 2010. 
23 U.S. Congress 2011. 
24 Toner and Trainer 2011. 
25 Cornfield 2011. 
26 Franz 2010. 
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further research is needed to fully understand the impact of post-­Citizens United spending by 
outside groups.  
THEORY 
 Many scholars have reached a consensus that campaign expenditures do affect election 
results.27 No political campaign could be run without the funds needed to pay staff, purchase 
advertisements, run a field operation, or send out mailings. All of these things are necessary in a 
basic political campaign and would not be possible without fundraising and expenditures. 
Political campaigns attempt to increase recognition of their candidate among the electorate and 
increase favorability. The efforts made by political campaigns through media or field operations 
increase voter awareness of the candidate·VSRVLWLRQVZKLFKZRXOGWKHRUHWLFDOO\LQFUHDVHYRWH
share for that candidate. Because expenditures allow for these crucial aspects of political 
campaigns, increased campaign expenditures are generally correlated with increased vote 
share.  
 Outside group spending follows the same logic as candidate campaign expenditures ² 
outside spending can be used to purchase advertisements, mailings, etc., which will increase 
vote share for the candidate favored by the outside group. Because outside groups can raise 
money in unlimited amounts, it is much easier for them to raise money quickly, for instance in 
response to big expenditures by the opposition. Outside groups, due to their ability to accept 
unlimited contributions, are also better equipped to make bigger media buys in targeted House 
races. Only the most competitive House races will attract outside spending, because outside 
groups strategically spend in races in which they have the most to gain ² a competitive race in 
which the candidate they favor has a good chance of winning. Outside spending comes in a 
variety of forms, including voter mobilization operations, but generally takes the form of 
broadcast advertisements. After Citizens United, fundraising is even easier for outside groups 
with the support of corporation and union spending, and this increases their ability to influence 
election results. In the 2010 midterms, spending by outside groups increased, and one would 
expect to find that their spending did have an impact on election results in the races targeted by 
these groups. 
                                               
27Abramowitz 1991;; Green and Krasno 1988;; Grier 1989;; Jacobson 1978; Jacobson 1990;; Krasno, Green and 
Cowden 1994. 
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H1: As the amount of outside spending that favors a candidate increases, the percentage of the vote 
received by that candidate will also increase. 
 While I hypothesize that outside group spending will have an impact in U.S. House 
races, this impact will differ between incumbents and challengers. Based on theories developed 
by Gary Jacobson, I expect that challengers will see a greater benefit from outside group 
spending because challengers have more to gain from expenditures. Expenditures by and on 
EHKDOIRIFKDOOHQJHUVKDYHDJUHDWHULPSDFWEHFDXVHWKH\DUH¶SXUFKDVLQJ·QDPHUHFRJQLWLRQDQG
visibility, which incumbents already have to some degree. Challengers see a greater marginal 
utility from their expenditures than do incumbents.  Because challengers start out at a 
disadvantage, they have more to gain from expenditures just to catch up to the benefits of 
incumbency. ,QFXPEHQWV·H[SHQGLWXUHVFDQeven have a negative relationship with votes 
received because incumbents spend more when they are more seriously challenged.28 I believe 
the same logic will apply to outside group spending on behalf of incumbents.  
H2: Outside spending on behalf of challengers will have a bigger impact on two-­party vote than outside 
spending on behalf of incumbents. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 This paper will examine U.S. House midterm elections in 2006 and 2010 in an attempt to 
assess the impact of outside group expenditures, while also controlling for other factors that 
influence House election results. Unopposed races will be excluded, and races with an 
incumbent and open seats are analyzed separately. The dynamics of open seat elections differ 
greatly from races with incumbents, as neither candidate has the incumbency advantages of 
name recognition and experience.  The dependent variable is the two-­party vote received by the 
incumbent, or for open seats, the two-­party vote received by the Democratic candidate.  
 The central independent variables are the outside spending in a district on behalf of both 
the challenger and the incumbent. This includes spending that both supports a candidate and 
opposes their opponent. However, the available data on outside spending is limited and 
incomplete. The available data includes only independent expenditures electioneering 
communications that specifically name a candidate as a beneficiary of the spending. Some 
expenditures name multiple candidate beneficiaries or are purely issue advocacy, so it is 
                                               
28 Jacobson 1978. 
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difficult to know how to divide these expenditures between the candidates. The aggregated 
numbers by district are available from both the Center for Responsive Politics (Open Secrets) 
and the Campaign Finance Institute, but the numbers from these two sources drastically differ 
for many districts.29 I used the larger number from either of the two sources for each district.  
For the 2006 midterm elections, outside expenditures for a single candidate range from $0 to 
$1,254,902.  For 2010, outside expenditures range from no money spent in a race to $3,153,517.  
This data does nRWFDSWXUHLVVXHDGYRFDF\DGYHUWLVHPHQWVRUDQ\VSHQGLQJWKDWLVQRW´H[SUHVV
advocacy,µwhich are advertisements that specifically call for election or defeat of a specified 
candidate. Although issue advocacy advertisements do not necessarily name candidate 
beneficiaries, it is possible that they also indirectly affect election results. Therefore, my study 
offers an incomplete assessment of the levels of outside spending in House races for both years, 
and the data flaws are therefore a clear limitation. 
 Other types of spending in each district are also included as independent variables ² 
both spending by the FDQGLGDWH·V campaign committees and independent expenditures made 
by political parties and their campaign committees in the district. For races with an incumbent, 
all of the spending variables represent WKHLQFXPEHQW·VDQGWKHFKDOOHQJHU·VH[SHQGLWXUHVLQWKH
district, covering the entire election cycle. For open seats, each type of spending is divided by 
Democrat or Republican. This only captures money actually spent by the candidates, not their 
fundraising totals.  Candidate expenditures come from FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHFDQGLGDWHV·
campaign committees that are regulated by the FEC.30  
 Political party independent expenditures in the district are included for challengers and 
incumbents, and these include independent expenditures made by the national parties and their 
campaign committees (DCCC, NRCC), commonly in the form of broadcast advertisements or 
field operations. Party involvement will likely only be at a meaningful level in the most 
competitive and targeted U.S. House races, and therefore this variable also captures some of the 
competitiveness of the race. However, the data readily available for this variable is also limited. 
For the 2006 election, the data includes national party committee independent and coordinated 
                                               
29 Campaign Finance Institute 2010;; Center for Responsive Politics 2006;; Center for Responsive Politics 
2010. 
30 Federal Election Commission 2006;; Federal Election Commission 2010. 
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expenditures and direct contributions for every House race.31 For the 2010 elections, the data 
includes only races in which there was over $50,000 of combined outside and party spending.32 
The data includes national party committee independent and coordinated expenditures and 
direct contributions. Party expenditures for 2010 range from $0 to $2,923,930, and therefore 
races in which party committees contributed less than $50,000 were likely to not be very highly 
competitive. While this is a limitation of the study, this data likely captures most of the relevant 
party expenditures because expenditures under $50,000 are less important compared to the total 
level of expenditures and likely not drastically affecting election results. All spending variables 
are entered in units of $10,000. 
 Variables included to control for factors other than expenditures that affect election 
outcomes include party, the two-­party vote percentage from the previous House election, the 
presidential vote in the district, the percent of the district that is urban, and the median 
household income of the district. The party variable represents the party of the incumbent 
(Democrats are coded as 1 and Republicans as 0) and is excluded from open seat cases. This 
variable captures the national political tides of each election year that affect races around the 
country.33 7KHSUHYLRXVHOHFWLRQUHVXOWVFRQWUROIRUWKHLQFXPEHQW·VSHUVRQDOYRWHLQWKHGLVWULFW 
This variable is coded as the two-­party vote percentage won by the incumbent in the previous 
election. However, some argue that this variable is less effective in predicting outcomes because 
it also captures a variety of factors from the past election, including national tide, traits of the 
specific candidates, and expenditures.34 This variable is also excluded from open seat cases, as it 
represents a different candidate as well as many other factors from the previous election. The 
presidential vote in the district controls for the baseline partisanship of the district and the 
characteristics of the district that influence partisanship. For races with an incumbent, the two-­
party vote received by the previous presidential candidate of WKHLQFXPEHQW·VSDUW\LVXVHG,Q
the separate model for open seat races, the percentage of votes received by the previous 
Democratic presidential candidate is used, as the dependent variable in this model is the 
percentage of the vote received by the Democratic candidate. The percentage of the district that 
                                               
31 Federal Election Commission 2007. 
32 Campaign Finance Institute 2010. 
33 Jacobson 1978. 
34 Levitt 1994. 
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is urban and the median income of the district, according to the 2000 Census,35 are included to 
control for demographic characteristics of the district that may affect political decisions. Both 
variables are also intended to capture variations in the expense of the media market of the 
district.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
35 Barone 2007. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 1: 2006 & 2010 Incumbent/Challenger Races 
Dependent Variable: Two-­party vote percentage received by the incumbent 
Independent 
Variable 
All 2006 
Incumbent Races 
2006 Incumbent 
Races (with outside 
money) 
All 2010 
Incumbent Races 
2010 Incumbent 
Races (with outside 
money) 
Constant 31.479 
(2.350) 
33.093 
(5.116) 
24.509 
(2.037) 
30.940 
(3.518) 
Challenger Outside 
Spending 
-­.034* 
(.018) 
-­.063 
-­.028 
(.021) 
-­.090 
-­.016* 
(.009) 
-­.055 
-­.021** 
(.010) 
-­.133 
Incumbent Outside 
Spending 
.054 
(.037) 
.048 
.036 
(.044) 
.058 
-­.007 
(.008) 
-­.026 
-­.002 
(.008) 
-­.016 
Challenger 
Campaign Spending 
-­.040*** 
(.007) 
-­.324 
-­.036*** 
(.009) 
-­.431 
-­.017*** 
(.004) 
-­.136 
-­.013** 
(.005) 
-­.172 
Incumbent 
Campaign Spending 
.002 
(.004) 
.020 
.001 
(.006) 
.019 
-­.006** 
(.003) 
-­.058 
-­.004 
(.003) 
-­.077 
Challenger Party 
Spending 
-­.013 
(.017) 
-­.065 
-­007 
(.019) 
-­.063 
-­.013 
(.011) 
-­.037 
-­.024** 
(.012) 
-­.139 
Incumbent Party 
Spending 
.014 
(.014) 
.083 
.006 
(.016) 
.061 
.010 
(.011) 
.029 
.002 
(.012) 
.009 
Party 10.195*** 
(.610) 
.509 
9.901*** 
(1.369) 
.487 
-­11.092*** 
(.625) 
-­.471 
-­7.776*** 
(1.333) 
-­.346 
Previous TPV% .109*** 
(.023) 
.148 
.075 
(.057) 
.086 
.147*** 
(.023) 
.181 
.106** 
(.038) 
.166 
Presidential Vote .397*** 
(.034) 
.396 
.263*** 
(.073) 
.267 
.618*** 
(.030) 
.628 
.501*** 
(.055) 
.567 
Urban .000 
(.017) 
-­.001 
.050 
(.040) 
.099 
-­.009 
(.015) 
-­.015 
-­.042 
(.026) 
-­.107 
Income -­8.462E-­6 
(.000) 
-­.013 
4.945E-­5 
(.000) 
.077 
1.025E-­5 
(.000) 
.014 
3.593E-­5 
(.000) 
.059 
N 
Adj. R-­square 
Model Significance 
F-­test 
Durbin-­Watson 
346 
.756 
.000 
98.230 
1.862 
108 
.661 
.000 
19.948 
1.633 
374 
.847 
.000 
188.487 
1.871 
133 
.683 
.000 
26.871 
2.170 
Note: Standard error in parentheses and beta weights italicized;; SSS 
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2006 Incumbent/Challenger Races 
 The variables in the 2006 Incumbent/Challenger races model explain about 75% of the 
variance in the percentage of the vote received by the incumbent. The significant variables are 
outside spending on behalf of the challenger, the challenger·Vcampaign expenditures, the party 
of the incumbent, the previous vote percentage won by the incumbent, and the presidential vote 
in the district. The party of the incumbent has the biggest impact on the results and has a 
positive relationship with the LQFXPEHQW·Vtwo-­party vote, demonstrating that Democrats 
(coded as 1) had more electoral success in 2006. This relationship reveals the national political 
tide observed in 2006, when many Democrats swept into office LQ3UHVLGHQW%XVK·VVHFRQG
midterm election. Presidential vote for the candidate RIWKHLQFXPEHQW·VSDUW\DQGWKH
LQFXPEHQW·VSUHYLRXVHOHFWLRQSHUFHQWDJHERWKKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH
LQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUH The results demonstrate that party and the presidential vote in the 
district are the most important variables driving election results, with greater impacts than any 
of the spending variables. 
 Outside expenditures that favor the challenger have a statistically significant, but weak 
QHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUH (beta weight of -­.063), showing that these 
types of expenditures are having their intended effect of boosting the challenger. The 
unstandardized partial regression coefficient of -­.034 (units of $10,000) shows that when a 
challenger receives $100,000 of oXWVLGHVSHQGLQJWKHLQFXPEHQW·VVKDUHRIWKHYRWHLVUHGXFHG
E\:KHQWKHDPRXQWRIRXWVLGHPRQH\LQFUHDVHVWRWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHLV
reduced by 3.4%. A margin of 3% could make a crucial difference in highly competitive 
elections, which demonstrates that outside money spent on behalf of the challenger can have an 
important impact on election results. However, outside expenditures on behalf of the 
incumbent are not significant. The expenditures of the challenger·VFDPSDLJQFRPPLWWHH have a 
VLJQLILFDQWDQGPRGHUDWHO\VWURQJQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLQFXPEHQW·VYRWe share (beta 
weight of -­.324), demonstrating that as challengers spend more, their percentage of the vote 
received increases. With a B value of -­.040, expenditures of $1,000,000 E\WKHFKDOOHQJHU·V
campaign would decrease the incumbent·s vote share by 4%, a considerable impact. The 
FKDOOHQJHUV· campaign expenditures are having a significant negative impact, whereas the 
incumbent spending of all types is not significant. This finding is consistent with the 
expectation of this study and previous research that challengers will see greater benefit from 
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spending because they have more to gain from initial spending through increased name 
recognition and other advantages the incumbent already has.36  Hypothesis 1 is supported 
EHFDXVHRXWVLGHVSHQGLQJWKDWIDYRUVWKHFKDOOHQJHULVLQFUHDVLQJWKHFKDOOHQJHU·VVKDUHRIWKH
vote.  Hypothesis 2 is also supported by this data because challengers are benefiting from 
outside expenditures, whereas incumbents do not see any statistically significant benefit from 
outside spending in this model.   
 In an effort to focus more clearly on independent expenditures in these races, I ran the 
same regression again using only cases that had a substantial level of outside or party spending. 
I included races with at least $10,000 of outside or party spending for at least one candidate and 
in which a challenger·VFDPSDLJQ made expenditures, in an effort to include only races 
competitive enough to draw non-­candidate spending. This operational decision left 108 cases.  
 In this model, outside spending for the challenger is not significant. Challenger 
campaign spending (beta weight of -­.431) is the second most powerful variable in the second 
model, whereas in the overall model, it is the third most powerful. The unstandardized partial 
regression coefficient for challenger campaign spending is -­.036 when including only races 
where outside money was present, compared to -­.040 in the overall model. The previous 
election vote percentage won by the incumbent is not significant, while party and presidential 
vote in the district are significant, but with lower relative strength compared to the aggregate 
model (beta weights of .487 and .267 respectively). The second model, which includes only races 
in which outside or party spending was a factor, maintains the findings of the model including 
all races, except that outside spending that favors challengers is not significant.  The first model 
includes many cases in which challengers were not viable candidates and therefore did not raise 
much money of any type. Consequently, it is not surprising that receiving money from outside 
groups is a more substantial predictor of electoral success in this model.  In the second model, 
only competitive races in which outside money was present were included;; considering just 
these limited cases, the independent impact of outside money is not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
                                               
36 Jacobson 1978. 
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2010 Incumbent/Challenger Races 
 The U.S. House races analyzed in 2010 not only have higher levels of spending overall 
than 2006, but also would be expected to demonstrate the effect of the Citizens United decision 
and the impact of new Super PACs formed in this cycle. I expect these increased spending 
levels in 2010 to result in a greater impact on election results, as outside money played a bigger 
role in the most recent midterm. Much media attention was given to the impact of the dramatic 
increase in the amount of independent expenditures in 2010, and this analysis attempts to 
determine if this spending really did influence the election results. 
 In the 2010 analysis, the variables explain about 85% of the variance in the election 
results for all races with an incumbent and challenger. The outside expenditures that favor the 
challenger are significant, although they have a comparatively low beta weight of -­.055 (the 
lowest of the significant variables). The slight negative relationship shows that outside 
spending that either opposes the incumbent or supports the challenger is decreasing the 
LQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUH  In this model, the B value for challenger outside spending (-­.016) 
indicates that if a challenger received $1,000,000 from outside groups, they would gain 1.6% of 
the vote.  In comparison to 2006, the unstandardized partial regression coefficient for challenger 
outside expenditures decreases from -­.034 to -­.016 in 2010.  This finding contrasts the 
expectation of this study that the impact of outside spending would be greater in the first 
election post-­Citizens United. This demonstrates that post-­Citizens United, outside spending on 
behalf of the challenger maintains a significant impact on election results, whereas outside 
expenditures on behalf of the incumbent do not have a statistically significant relationship with 
vote share.  
 Challenger candidate campaign expenditures had the biggest impact of the spending 
variables (beta weight of -­.136). In the most recent midterm, expenditures by the incumbent·V
campaign also have a statistically significant and slight negative relationship with the 
LQFXPEHQW·VWZR-­party vote (beta weight of -­.058). This finding is consistent with previous 
research. Because incumbents spend at higher levels when they are more seriously challenged 
(when their challenger is spending a meaningful amount of money), their expenditures can 
have a negative relationship with their votes received. For every $1,000,000 incumbents spend, 
their own percentage of the vote decreases by 0.6%.  Overall, the most important result of this 
54  RES PUBLICA 
 
model is that outside spending that favors the challenger is significant with a relationship in the 
expected direction. However, the unstandardized partial regression coefficient for outside 
spending on behalf of challengers is smaller in 2010 than in 2006, showing that in the models 
LQFOXGLQJDOOUDFHVFKDOOHQJHUV·RXWVLGHH[SHQGLWXUHVKDGDJUHDWHULPpact in 2006. 
 In addition, party of the incumbent, previous vote received by the incumbent, and 
presidential vote in the district are all significant. The presidential vote for the candidate of the 
same party as the incumbent has the biggest impact on vote received by the incumbent, with a 
beta weight of .628. In 2010, the party variable had a strong negative relationship with the 
LQFXPEHQW·VYRWH (beta weight of -­.471);; the opposite relationship is observed in the 2006 data. 
This was expected given the strong Republican national tide observed in 2010. In 2006, the B 
value for incumbent races was 10.195, and in 2010, the B value was -­11.092.  This demonstrates 
that not only did the direction of the relationship change, but the strength of the party variable 
also increased in 2010, indicating that the Republican wave of 2010 was more powerful than the 
Democratic wave of 2006. 
 Overall, the data supports Hypothesis 1, that post-­Citizens United outside spending will 
increase the vote share of the candidate favored by the groups, because challenger outside 
spending has a statistically significant negative UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHV 
However, this hypothesis is not entirely supported by the data, as outside expenditures 
supporting the incumbent do not have a significant relationship with votes received. For this 
reason, outside money is not uniformly impacting election results in the favor of the candidates 
supported by the expenditures.  In the 2010 model, campaign spending by the incumbent is 
VLJQLILFDQWDQGWKHXQVWDQGDUGL]HGSDUWLDOUHJUHVVLRQFRHIILFLHQWVIRUFKDOOHQJHU·VRXWVLGHDQG
campaign spending are lower than in 2006, when no type of incumbent spending had a 
significant relationship with results. Hypothesis 2 is also supported, as only challengers are 
benefiting from the impact of outside spending on their behalf, demonstrated by the statistically 
VLJQLILFDQWUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHV,QFXPEHQWVVHHQRVWDWLVWLFDOly significant 
benefit from outside expenditures on their behalf in either 2006 or 2010, whereas challengers do 
receive a statistically significant impact from outside money in the model including all races in 
both years.  
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 Table 1 presents the data after excluding any races in 2010 that did not have over $10,000 
of outside or party spending, nor spending by the challenger candidate. The strong 
UHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHDQGSDUW\SUHYLRXVYRWHDQGSUHVLGHQWLDOYRWH
persist in this equation, demonstrating the importance of these variables in predicting election 
outcomes. While presidential vote and party are the two most powerful variables in the model, 
expenditures are also impacting election results. After eliminating races without substantial 
levels of outside spending or party spending, all types of spending on behalf of challengers are 
significant. Incumbent spending of any type is not significant, but party spending on behalf of 
the challenger is significant for the first time in any model (p.05). The unstandardized partial 
regression coefficient for challenger outside spending is -­.021 S when only races where 
outside spending is a factor are included, whereas in the aggregate model for 2010, the partial 
regression coefficient is -­.016 S.1). In the second model, $1,000,000 spent by outside groups on 
behalf of the challengHUUHGXFHVWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUH by about 2%. Challenger 
expenditures and both outside and party expenditures on behalf of the challenger have 
statistically significant negative relationships with votes received by the incumbent. While in 
the 2006 model of only races with outside spending, challenger outside spending is not 
significant, it is significant in the same model in 2010.  This reveals a change post-­Citizens 
United;; outside money impacted election results when only the most competitive races that 
drew non-­candidate spending were included only in 2010.   
2006 & 2010 Open Seat Races 
 In the analysis of open seat races for both years, the variable for presidential vote is 
measured as the percentage of the vote received by the previous Democratic presidential 
candidate. Each of the expenditure variables were entered as the amount spent by Democrats 
and Republicans. The regression analyses for open seats show some different variables having 
an impact than the incumbent/challenger models.  
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Table 2: 2006 & 2010 Open Seat Races 
Dependent Variable: Two-­party vote percentage won by the Democratic candidate 
Independent 
Variable 
2006 Open Seat 
Races 
2010 Open Seat 
Races 
Constant 20.046 
(8.465) 
18.607 
(5.762) 
Democratic Outside 
Spending 
-­.121 
(.080) 
-­.163 
.027 
(.048) 
.055 
Republican Outside 
Spending 
.093 
(.073) 
.109 
.010 
(.019) 
.044 
Democrat Campaign 
Spending 
.044** 
(.017) 
.362 
.016 
(.016) 
.097 
Republican 
Campaign Spending 
-­.020* 
(.011) 
-­.220 
-­.007 
(.016) 
-­.037 
Democratic Party 
Spending 
-­.006 
(.030) 
-­.037 
.022 
(.026) 
.098 
Republican Party 
Spending 
.006 
(.025) 
.042 
.005 
(.038) 
.017 
Democratic 
Presidential Vote 
.841*** 
(.094) 
.843 
.706*** 
(.108) 
.702 
Urban .045 
(.068) 
.068 
.190** 
(.085) 
.264 
Income .000 
(.000) 
-­.170 
-­.001*** 
(.000) 
-­.425 
N 
Adj. R-­square 
Model Significance 
F-­test 
Durbin-­Watson 
32 
.848 
.000 
20.196 
2.117 
43 
.861 
.000 
29.847 
1.819 
Note: Standard error in parentheses and beta weights italicized;; SS**S 
 In an analysis of the open seat races in 2006, both the spending by the Democrat and the 
Republican candidate are significant, and each has a relationship in the expected direction. The 
equation for open seats explains about 85% of the variance in the Democratic vote, with the 
biggest impact coming from the presidential vote in the district for the Democratic candidate, 
followed by WKH'HPRFUDWLFFDQGLGDWH·VH[SHQGLWXUHV Both expenditures by the Democratic and 
Republican candidates have a statistically significant relationship with the Democratic two-­
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party vote in the district in their expected directions. Expenditures by Democratic candidates (B 
value of .044) have a stronger effect upon votes than does spending by Republican candidates 
(B value of .020), which could be due to the national political tide favoring Democratic 
candidates in 2006. It is also possible that there are differences between how effectively 
candidates of the two parties spend their money in the district. The expenditures made by both 
FDQGLGDWHVDUHVLJQLILFDQWLQWKLVRSHQVHDWHTXDWLRQZKHUHDVRQO\FKDOOHQJHUV·H[SHQGLWXUHVare 
significant in analysis of incumbent/challenger races. This could be due to the distinct 
dynamics of open seat races;; both candidates receive the same (and more immediate) types of 
benefits from spending that challengers do because they need to gain name recognition and 
voter awareness.  
 For both the 2006 and 2010 open seat races, results were analyzed separately with the 
same operational decision used for incumbent/challenger races ² using only races with more 
than $10,000 of outside or party spending and in which both candidates made expenditures. 
However, this did not eliminate as many cases for open seats as it did for incumbent/challenger 
races. Because open seat races are generally more competitive than races with an incumbent, 
they are more likely to have outside or party spending. Both the R square values and coefficient 
values were very similar to the initial equation, and therefore results are not included here. 
 The results for 2010 open seat races indicate similar results to 2006 open seats, with the 
variables explaining about 86% of the variance in the Democratic vote in the district. The 
significant variables are the presidential vote in the district for the Democratic candidate, the 
percent of the district that is urban, and the median income. Once again, presidential vote is 
having the biggest impact on election results, with a beta weight of .702. However, the urban 
variable and median income also have statistically significant relationships with Democratic 
vote (beta weights of .264 and -­.425 respectively). It is unclear why these variables are only 
having a statistically significant impact on election results for open seats. The percent of the 
district that is urban has a statistically significant relationship (p.05) with Democratic vote in 
the district, demonstrating that more urban districts are more likely to vote for Democrats. The 
median income in the district has a statistically significant negative relationship, showing that 
as income increases, votes received by Democratic candidates decrease. Demographic 
characteristics of the districts are having a substantial impact on election results in the analysis 
58  RES PUBLICA 
 
of open seat races only, and it is unclear why they are having such an impact. Neither 
hypothesis is supported by the open seat data, as outside spending is not significant in either 
year.  
Comparisons between 2006 & 2010 
 In analyzing the differences between the results for the 2006 and 2010 midterm elections, 
it is evident which variables consistently affect election results: presidential vote in the district, 
party of the incumbent, WKHLQFXPEHQW·V previous voteDQGWKHFKDOOHQJHU·VVSHQGLQJ 
Presidential vote has a larger impact on election results in 2010, demonstrated by the increase in 
B values. However, challenger candidate spending has a lower unstandardized partial 
regression coefficient in 2010 compared to 2006. The change in the direction of the relationship 
for the party variable between the years clearly demonstrates the change in the national political 
tides³ in 2006, for Democrats, and in 2010, for Republicans. 
 Outside spending that favors the challenger is significant in both years when including 
all races. However, in the model including only races with non-­candidate spending, challenger 
outside spending is only significant in 2010.  This demonstrates a greater impact of outside 
spending for challengers only following Citizens United, as it continued to impact results in 
races that were competitive enough to draw substantial outside spending. Outside spending 
favoring incumbent candidates is not significant in any model, a finding consistent with 
previous research. The data for all incumbent/challenger races in both 2006 and 2010 supports 
Hypothesis 1 and 2, as does the model for competitive races with an incumbent in 2010. In each 
of these models, outside spending on behalf of the challenger has a statistically significant 
QHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUHshowing that challengers saw a greater 
benefit from outside spending than did incumbents. 
 The results for open seat elections did not support my hypotheses, and candidate 
campaign spending variables are only significant in 2006. Outside spending is not significant in 
either year, but expenditures by both Democratic and Republican candidates are statistically 
significant with relationships in the expected directions in 2006. The R square values remain 
high for open seats, but the presidential vote variable is having the greatest impact on the 
election results, which fits both expectations and previous research. The demographic variables 
in open seat races are having statistically significant impacts on the election results in 2010, 
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which was not true for elections with an incumbent. The reasons behind the explanatory power 
of these variables for open seats are unclear and could be an avenue for future research.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The results of this analysis do not conclusively determine the impact of the Citizens 
United decision on the relationship between outside expenditures and election outcomes but 
begin to fill a gap in the research. The first hypothesis (as the amount of outside spending that 
favors a candidate increases, the percentage of the vote received by the candidate will also 
increase) is supported by three of the six models in this study. While outside spending did have 
a small impact on election results for challengers in both years, the results do not fully 
demonstrate the influence of outside money. Challenger outside money is significant in the 
model of only races with a substantial level of outside spending in 2010 but not in 2006, 
revealing that outside money was more influential post-­Citizens United. However, the relatively 
small impact of outside spending could also reveal that the journalists and political activists 
have overstated the impact of Citizens United on our electoral process. The impact of an increase 
in outside money and an increase in any type of spending for a candidate appear to affect 
election results in the same way. For example, in the 2006 model of all races, $1,000,000 of 
outside spending in support of the challenger and $1,000,000 spent by tKHFKDOOHQJHU·V
campaign reduce WKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUHE\DQG4.0% respectively. In the same model 
in 2010, $1,000,000 of outside spending in support of the challenger and $1,000,000 spent by the 
FKDOOHQJHU·VFDPSDLJQUHGXFH WKHLQFXPEHQW·VYRWHVKDUHE\DQGUHVSHFWLYHO\For 
this reason, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of each type of spending in House races. 
Hypothesis 2 is supported by the results of this experiment, showing that challengers saw 
greater benefit from their expenditures and incumbents received no statistically significant 
effect from expenditures on their behalf.  
Limitations 
 The most obvious limitation of this study is the lack of accurate and complete data on 
both outside expenditures and party independent expenditures. Different sources of campaign 
finance data report different amounts for these types of expenditures, both because of the 
difficulty of compiling and counting these types of expenditures and the limitations of the data 
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collected by the FEC. Both sources acknowledge the limitations of their data, with a staff 
member of the Campaign Finance Institute, Brendan Glavin, saying via personal 
correspondence´It is also important to note that this only represents the reported spending of 
outside groups, and there is much additional spending that goes on that cannot be quantified 
WKURXJKUHSRUWVµ In addition to incomplete data on express advocacy independent 
expenditures, no data is available on issue advocacy advertisements sponsored by outside 
groups, even though these types of advertisements frequently indirectly impact election results. 
It is possible that the data used in this study greatly understates the amount of outside spending 
for both years, but especially for 2010. This lack of complete data would certainly impact the 
results, as they would not fully demonstrate the impact of the Citizens United decision.  
 Because the only election post-­Citizens United was an unusually strong election for 
Republican candidates, it is possible that the data is not typical or representative of the impact 
of outside spending. The national political tide for Republicans was clearly the most important 
factor in the 2010 midterm elections, and this may have mitigated the impact of expenditures. In 
addition, the 2006 midterm was another unusually strong wave election, but for Democrats.  It 
is possible that the strength of the national party tides each year affected the dynamics of the 
elections in this study.  Other limitations of this study include the difficulty of isolating the 
impact of variables related to campaign expenditures. Many of the spending variables would be 
highly affected by the competitiveness of the race³ a determinant of not only how much 
PRQH\LVVSHQWEXWDOVRFDQGLGDWHV·DELOLW\WRUDLVHPRQH\ Because most of the variables 
included in this study, especially the partisanship of the district, national political tides, and the 
previous election results, all affect how easily both candidates can raise money, the results may 
not accurately describe the relationship between expenditures and vote share. Many cases in the 
study had extremely low levels of spending by challenger candidates, indicating that the race 
was essentially noncompetitive, which would skew regression results. The impact of 
expenditures on election results is a relationship generally agreed upon by political scientists, 
but one that is difficult to measure precisely.  
 
Implications 
 This study begins to fill a gap in the literature on campaign finance by specifically 
examining the impact of independent expenditures. This study is among the first to attempt to 
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determine the impact of the changes in campaign finance law and practice after the Citizens 
United decision, while also controlling for other factors that impact election results.37 More 
recent studies of post-­Citizens United spending have only analyzed aggregate spending levels in 
all races, rather than analyzing the impact relative to other factors influencing elections. The 
findings of this study are consistent with the body of previous research on the impact of money 
on Congressional elections, finding that spending of any type that supports challengers has a 
greater impact than spending supporting incumbents. Spending by challengers is expected to 
have a greater impact on election results, and most studies find that incumbent spending 
actually negatively impacts votes received because incumbent spending increases when they 
are more seriously challenged. 38 This study finds that these same relationships hold true when 
applied to new forms of outside spending unleashed by Citizens United. Outside spending 
favoring the challenger is impacting vote share more than outside spending on behalf of the 
incumbent.  
 Future research could design a similar study with a nonrecursive model in order to 
further examine the relationship between outside spending and election results. Because both 
raising and spending money in Congressional races is a dynamic process, it is possible that 
money spent by the challenger earlier in the election process is influencing the amount of 
money the challenger receives from both the party and outside groups.  This study views the 
election as a snapshot, taken at the end of the campaign, by looking at the final amounts of each 
type of spending. But because challengers generally need to demonstrate their viability by 
reaching a certain fundraising threVKROGLWLVDSRVVLELOLW\WKDWH[SHQGLWXUHVE\WKHFKDOOHQJHU·V
campaign are affecting both the party and outside expenditures they receive.  Because this 
study is a static model of expenditures, it would not capture this possibility.  Future research 
could address the possibility of a nonrecursive model and design a dynamic model that would 
capture variance in the impact of expenditures throughout the election cycle. Another avenue 
for future research would be repeating this experiment with more elections under the same 
campaign finance regulations and with more accurate data in order to further illustrate the 
impact of outside spending.  
                                               
37 Cornfield 2011;; Franz 2010;; Toner and Trainer 2011.  
38 Abramowitz 1991;; Green and Krasno 1988;; Grier 1989;; Jacobson 1978;; Jacobson 1990;; Krasno, Green 
and Cowden 1994. 
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 The limitations of this research demonstrate the importance of more accurate data 
collection and aggregation in the future of independent expenditures and electioneering 
communications, especially those that are not express advocacy. This is important information 
not only for public awareness of outside group involvement in elections, but also to determine 
the real impact of these expenditures on outcomes. This study and continued research on 
independent expenditures have LPSRUWDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSROLWLFDOFDPSDLJQV·VSHQGLQJ
strategies and also for campaign finance law. 7KHUHVXOWVVKRZWKDWFKDOOHQJHUV·H[SHQGLWXres 
are consistently having more of an impact on election results than those of incumbents. The 
extremely high rates of reelection for incumbent candidates show the difficulty challengers face. 
In order to ensure an effective competitive democracy, experienced and viable challengers are 
necessary. On a normative level, it is troubling that expenditures by the challenger are such a 
clear indicator of electoral success because true democratic competition in House races seems 
unlikely and difficult without a well-­funded challenger. This study begins to determine the 
impact of new types of outside expenditures in U.S. House elections after Citizens United, but 
further research is necessary in order to determine the extent of this impact and if the media has 
overstated the importance of outside group expenditures on election outcomes.  
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THE ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE: 
AN ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ITS EXPLANATORY POWER 
Jiaxing Xu 
 
Abstract: Beginning in the 1990s, a trend of using the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence has 
emerged. However, previous research mainly focuses on individual cases with large-­scale violence;; 
whether ethnic security dilemma theory is a sound approach to explain less violent ethnic conflict remains 
unclear. This paper employs a large-­N design and tests the hypothesis that the ethnic security dilemma 
causes ethnic conflicts, without discriminating between differences in severity and scale of conflict. The 
paper also conducts a longitudinal comparison with a previous quantitative model using the latest data 
available. The empirical results do not support the hypothesis and suggest that the explanatory power of 
the ethnic security dilemma has declined over time. Although there is no definite conclusion that the 
ethnic security dilemma is not a useful explanation for less violent ethnic conflicts, given the limitations 
of this research, I conclude with a theoretical discussion questioning the applicability of the theory. 
Supplemented with this qualitative assessment, I conclude that a quantitative study of the ethnic security 
dilemma used to explain ethnic violence may not be a viable option for future research in this field. 
INTRODUCTION 
The growing interest in the study of ethnic violence is partly the result of the sweeping 
wave of bloody violence occurring after the Cold War, which left weakened Weberian states 
extremely susceptible to a variety of violence, including ethnic violence.1 The study of ethnic 
conflicts is a relatively new subfield within social science. Ethnic conflicts closely associate with 
studies of ethnicity and nationalism on the one hand, and studies of political violence on the 
other.2 Efforts have been made to foster disciplinary debates between those non-­intersecting 
literatures in the past decades, and, as a result, the domain of the study and key research 
questions are more clearly formulated, with a central focus on the causes of ethnic violence.  
Scholars have given various explanations, ranging from instrXPHQWDOLVWV·YLHZRI
UHODWLYHGHSULYDWLRQWRFRQVWUXFWLYLVWV·YLHZRIWKUHDWHQHGLGHQWLW\$WUHQGRIXVLQJWKH
international relations concept of the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence emerged in 
the 1990s. Various case studies affirm that this causal mechanism provides an explanation for 
                                                                                                                          
1 Desjarlais and Kleinman 1994. 
2 Brubaker and Laitin 1998.  
66  RES PUBLICA 
 
large-­scale ethnic violence in particular countries, but only a few studies have attempted to 
quantify this concept and empirically measure the explanatory power of this framework. Thus, 
several critical questions remain unanswered or answered unsatisfactorily:  
Is the ethnic security dilemma a coherent explanation of some lesser violent ethnic 
conflicts? Is the ethnic security dilemma suitable for a mass application, or only to specific 
cases? How should one approach a quantitative study aiming to operationalize this rather 
complex concept? Has the explanatory power of ethnic security dilemma changed over time?  
These questions are important because it must be determined whether the ethnic 
security dilemma yields any fruitful results in a large-­N study;; the answer of which will direct 
future research efforts. Only if such a study provides a promising outlook will a broader 
application of this theoretical framework be justified. Otherwise, the use of the ethnic security 
dilemma theory will be restricted to specific conflict dyads on a case-­by-­case analysis. 
  This research paper will attempt to address these problems and fill in the gap existing 
in the current literature.  Therefore, the central question of this research is: does the security 
dilemma cause ethnic violence in a statistically significant way, regardless of WKHFDVH·Vscale 
and severity? If so, to what extent does the effect the security dilemma explain the occurrence 
and intensity of recent ethnic violence? If not, what are some problems with the theory in its 
broader application, and is there any inherent limitation of this theory? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ethnicity, Ethnic groups, and Ethnic Conflict 
Ethnicity lacks a universally acknowledged definition, but I chose to base my paper on 
+RURZLW]·VEULHIGLVFXVVLRQRIHWKQLFLW\DQGHWKQLFJURXSVEHFDXVHRILWVZHOO-­balanced nature 
DQG+RURZLW]·VUHFRJQL]HGLQWHOOHFWXDODXWKRULW\LQWKHILHOG  
He first quotes Enid SchidkrRXW·VIRUPXODWLRQ´WKHPLQLPDOGHILQLWLRQRIDQHWKQLFXQLW
>«@LVWKHLGHDRIFRPPRQSURYHQDQFHUHFUXLWPHQWSULPDULO\WKRXJKNLQVKLSDQGDQRWLRQRI
GLVWLQFWLYHQHVVZKHWKHURUQRWWKLVFRQVLVWVRIDXQLTXHLQYHQWRU\RIFXOWXUDOWUDLWVµ3  The core 
definition of ethnicity, according to Horowitz´HPEUDFHVJURXSVGLIIHUHQWLDWHGE\FRORU
                                                                                                                          
3 Horowitz 1986, 53. 
RES PUBLICA  67 
  
ODQJXDJHDQGUHOLJLRQLWFRYHUV¶WULEHV·¶UDFHV·¶QDWLRQDOLWLHV·DQGFDVWHVµ4 and the membership 
LVW\SLFDOO\QRWFKRVHQEXWJLYHQµ5 Conflict is yet another fuzzy concept. This paper does not 
attempt to clearly distinguish between conflict and violence, but rather to treat ethnic violence 
DVDYLROHQWDQGPRUHVHYHUHYDULDWLRQRIFRQIOLFW6LPSO\SXW´FRQIOLFWLVDVWUXJJOHLQZKLFKWKH
aim is to gain objectives anGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\WRQHXWUDOL]HLQMXUHRUHOLPLQDWHULYDOVµ6 
7KHFRPELQDWLRQRI´HWKQLFµDQGFRQIOLFWFUHDWHVDQRWKHULQWHUHVWLQJ definitional 
problem. Ethnicity may be at work in certain cases of violence, but they can hardly be said to be 
ethnic conflicts if other factors primarily account for their occurrences. As Brubaker and Laitin 
DUJXHKRZ´HWKQLFµPRGLILHV´FRQIOLFWVµRU´YLROHQFHµUHPDLQVXQFOHDUDQGODUJHO\
unexamined.7 But several defining characteristics of ethnic conflicts can be summarized as 
follows. First, ethnic conflicts are inter-­communal, meaning two groups in a given conflict are 
strictly identified by their kinship and ethnic identities. Second, two parties cannot both be 
states or representatives of states.8 Third, motives of the conflicts are usually ethnically related 
and common goals include to gain more political autonomy or to establish a separate state.   
Theories of Ethnic Conflicts 
Three general theoretical approaches that almost encompass all research of ethnic 
conflicts are primordial, instrumental, and constructive. The primordial approach views ethnic 
conflicts as unavoidable, because the problems root in the inherent differences between ethnic 
groups. In other words, ethnic identity itself is the determinant of ethnic conflicts. In contrast, 
WKHLQVWUXPHQWDOLVWDSSURDFK´XQGHUVWDQGVHWKQLFLW\DVDWRROXVHGE\LQGLYLGXDOVJURXSVRU
HOLWHVWRREWDLQVRPHODUJHUW\SLFDOO\PDWHULDOHQGµ9 Constructivists, on the other hand, see 
ethnic identity as a social construction and thus each conflict has its special social origin. 
Ethnic conflicts, in many respects, resemble political violence that takes place at the 
interstate level. It is a natural progression for scholars to go beyond the realm of ethnic relations 
and political violence and to ponder the possibilities of taking an interdisciplinary approach to 
examine the cause of ethnic conflict.  
                                                                                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 Horowitz 1986, 56. 
6 Horowitz 1986, 95. 
7 Brubaker and Laitin 1998. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Lake and Rothchild 1998, 5.  
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Security Dilemma as an International Relations Theory Concept    
´7KHJUHDWHVWZDULQKLVWRU\FRXOGEHSURGXFHGZLWKRXWWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQRIDQ\JUHDWFULPLQDOV
who might be out to do deliberate harm to the world but with two actors each desperately 
DQ[LRXVWRDYRLGFRQIOLFWRIDQ\VRUWµ10 
 
The security dilemma concept was first used by John Herz in 1951.11 The tragedy of 
security dilemma becomes possible due to the anarchic nature of the international system and 
inherent uncertainty and fear of states for their own security. Some important developments in 
SROLWLFDOSV\FKRORJ\HVSHFLDOO\5REHUW-HUYLV·Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, open the door for a new way of thinking about international conflicts. The argument 
that intentions of one party may be misperceived is a critical premise of the security dilemma. 
Several other scholars outline the central theoretical framework of security dilemma as follows: 
States are rational actors and self-­help is the only way to guarantee the survival of the states in 
an DQDUFKLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\'HFLVLRQPDNHUVKDYHWRFRQVWDQWO\SHUFHLYHRWKHUV·LQWHQWLRQV
EXWEHQLJQLQWHQWLRQVRIRQHSDUW\·VDFWLRQGHIHQVLYHRUPHUHO\DLPLQJDWLQFUHDVLQJRQH·VRZQ
security) can be misperceived as malign (offensive). Thus this misperception triggers a 
counteraction which is not necessarily offensive but may be misperceived as well. Thus 
FRQIURQWDWLRQHVFDODWHVDQGVHFXULWLHVRIERWKDFWRUVGHFOLQH´7KHXQLTXHDQDO\WLFFRUHRIWKH
security dilemma lies in situations in which one or more disputing parties have incentives to 
resort to preemptive uses of forceµ12  
The Ethnic Security Dilemma: an Alternative Use 
Recent studies have proven that the conceptual frame of the security dilemma is useful 
when thinking about ethnic conflicts at the intrastate level, although its relevance may be 
difficult to see at first sight. The application of the security dilemma was first popularized by 
Barry Posen13. Posen articulates some interesting parallels between an international system and 
ethnic relations within a state IURPDUHDOLVW·VSHUVSHFWLYH)LUVWWKHFROODSVHRILmperial regimes 
SURGXFHVWKHSUREOHPRI´HPHUJLQJDQDUFK\µ6HFRQGHWKQLFJURXSVEHKDYHDVLIWKH\DUHVWDWHV
ZLWKRXWWKHDVVXUDQFHRIWKHLUVHFXULW\E\WKHVWDWHDQGWKXV´WKHVHFXULW\GLOHPPDDIIHFWVWKH
                                                                                                                          
10 Butterfield 1952, 21. 
11 Roe 1999. 
12 Lake and Rothchild 1998;; Leuprecht 2010;; Roe 2002.  
13 Roe 1999. 
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relations among these groups, just as it affects UHODWLRQVDPRQJVWDWHVµ7KLUG´WKH
indistinguishability of offence and defensHµIDYRUVWKHZRUVW-­case analysis and preemptive 
action.14 All these conditions will similarly generate a spiral of action and reaction that is 
typically found in an international conflict. The most popular examples of the security dilemma 
include the former Yugoslavia150ROGRYD·VFLYLOZDU16, and Croatia.17 
Later development of this paradigm concerns what constitutes the security of an ethnic 
group.  Societal security, a dimension of state security that by itself can be a referent object18, is 
viewed as very important for ethnic minorities. Societal security broadly captures traits relating 
to the preservation of group identity, including language, customs, and religious practices.  
Waver gives a formal definition of societal security: 
 
´The ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions 
and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within 
acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, 
association, and religious and national identity and custom.µ19  
 
 Survival of an ethnic group in this sense is less dependent on the economic power or 
military strength, but on a sense of group cohesion and a guarantee of continual practice or 
H[SUHVVLRQRILWVWUDGLWLRQ,QDGGLWLRQWKHHWKQLFVHFXULW\GLOHPPDLV´FORVHUWRD¶SHUFHStual 
VHFXULW\GLOHPPD·UDWKHUWKDQD¶VWUXFWXUDOVHFXULW\GLOHPPD.·µ20 So actual conditions of the 
security dilemma do not matter as much as whether the ethnic groups perceive such conditions. 
The literature on security dilemma theory is largely comprised of qualitative analyses, 
with a vast majority focusing on single or comparative case studies. Several prominent uses of 
WKHFRQFHSWLQFOXGH.DXIPDQ·V Spiraling to Ethnic War (1996)LQZKLFKKHDQDO\VHV0ROGRYD·V
path to civil war. In this article, Kaufman reasoned that one condition of the ethnic security 
dilemma is de facto anarchy. Paul Roe elaborates on the security dilemma by tracking the roots 
                                                                                                                          
14 Posen 1991, 27-­33. 
15 Dulic and Kostic 2010;; Posen 1991. 
16 Kaufman 1996. 
17 Roe 2004. 
18 Roe 1999. 
19 Waver 1993;; Roe 1999. 
20 Kaufman 1996, 112. 
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of several concepts involved and uses them to analyze the Hungarian-­Romanian struggle-­-­-­´WKH
7UDQV\OYDQLD·VVRFLHWDOVHFXULW\GLOHPPDµ21 One should notice that the security dilemma theory 
is mostly used to explain large-­scale ethnic conflicts that ultimately result in civil wars or ethnic 
cleansings. Subsequent development of this strand of literature produces many variations. 
Some scholars use the theory in a much limited sense, only explaining a single aspect of a case. 
One example of this variation is the demographic security dilemma.  The author shows that 
how an economic project causes security dilemma between Hans and minorities in west 
borders.22 Although those researchers use the core causal explanation provided by security 
dilemma, these less rigid uses of the concept make their true applicability and its explanatory 
power questionable. 
Few attempts have been made to operationalize the security dilemma into a quantitative 
analysis, or at least provide some statistical guidance on how powerful  the paradigm is in 
explaining ethnic violence. Unlike other approaches in which causes often have identifiable 
indicators suitable for both qualitative accounts and statistical manipulations, the security 
dilemma involves a causal chain and some not easily quantifiable concepts.  
But in his book Anarchy Within, Erik Melander makes a breakthrough. He painstakingly 
constructs a game theory model to capture the dynamics of the ethnic security dilemma. 
0HODQGHU·VILUVWVWHSHQDEOHVKLPWRLGHQWLI\WKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH´Uestraint breakdownµ, 
ZKLFKLVGHILQHGDVWKH´SUHHPSWLYHUHVRUWWRODUge-­VFDOHHWKQLFZDUIDUHµ+HWKHQGHULYHVWKUHH
empirical indicators, namely, status quo utility, fear, and first strike advantages, from his 
previous game theory analysis. He further operationalized them into measurable independent 
variables as separatist grievance, democracy, and ethnoterritorial dominance respectively. It is 
expected that lower status quo utility, more fear, and high first strike advantage will lead to a 
severe security dilemma and thus cause ethnic violence manifested in the form of warfare or 
mass guerilla activity. His UHVXOWVSURYLGH´VWURQJVXSSRUWIRUWKHQRWLRQWKDWWKH6HFXULW\
Dilemma is a sound causal mechanism of high relevance for explaining the outbreak of large-­
scale ethnic warfare and cleansing in a context of pROLWLFDOWUDQVLWLRQµ23  
                                                                                                                          
21 Roe 2002, 67. 
22 Clarke 2007.  
23 Melander 1999, 109. 
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This is a sound and logically coherent application of the security dilemma concept. But 
several limitations are obvious. First, the scope of the study is limited. The ethnic security 
dilemma may only provide explanations to severe ethnic conflicts. By setting a high threshold 
in coding only cases with severe outbreaks of violence, Melander loses the opportunity to 
investigate whether or not the theory can provide meaningful insight into ethnic violence in a 
full spectrum.  Second, as Melander himself admits, the indicators are somewhat crude. All 
variables are dummy variables, while available data allows more accurate representation of the 
concepts. 
I will try to develop an alternative quantitative model, using Minorities at Risk (MaR)24 
dataset, to test the soundness of security dilemma as a causal explanation of ethnic violence. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Does the security dilemma cause ethnic violence in a statistically significant way, given 
all cases available? And if so, to what extent does the security dilemma affect the occurrence 
and intensity of ethnic violence? If not, what are the implications of the results? My hypothesis 
is straightforward: the more severe the security dilemma, the more severe the ethnic violence. 
This hypothesis has been used or implied in many studies, but what differentiates this research 
is the methodology.  
Turning this hypothesis into a working one remains daunting because the ethnic 
security dilemma, like many other complex theoretical concepts, lacks direct quantifiable 
potential.  Some scholars take an indirect approach to test this hypothesis in their studies, one of 
which is to deliberately introduce intervening variables that are the logical consequences of the 
ethnic security dilemma, and test the relationship between the intervening variables and the 
dependent variables.  This is problematic because intervening variables by themselves may 
explain the ethnic violence without any reference to the security dilemma theory-­an indirect 
causation problem. Many more have chosen to give anecdotal accounts in their case studies to 
make a qualitative assessment of the hypothesis. Another approach is to test variables that are 
strongly indicative of, or that will cause an ethnic security dilemma. Melander takes a similar 
path in his study.  
                                                                                                                          
24 Minorities at Risk Project 2009.  
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I will try to justify my selection of several variables that constitute the ethnic security 
dilemma and develop a testable model in a large-­N design.  
 
Components of the Security Dilemma 
ANARCHY: In his work, Posen UHFRJQL]HGWKDW´HPHUJLQJDQDUFK\µLVDSUHFRQGLWLRQRI
ethnic security dilemma.25 Anarchy, in an intrastate context, may not only refer to a lack of 
central authority, but also to a lack of public services and various social programs that produces 
a perception of a quasi-­anarchic environment. It will lead to a security dilemma because when 
groups perceive their governments as being unable to take action to protect their identities and 
address their cultural concerns, they will increasingly rely on self-­help. Lack of rule 
enforcement provides motivation to resort to violence rather than an incapable superior 
authority.   
FEAR. Fear is an essential dimension of the security dilemma because any uncertainty of 
the future will make members of ethnic groups feel vulnerable, and thus an action of the 
opposed party will be more likely to trigger violent reactions. Different kinds of fear will 
contribute to the ethnic security dilemma mechanism. I categorize fear into three variations: 1) 
fear of loss of group identity;; 2) fear of repression of ethnic tradition;; 3) fear of physical survival 
(ethnic cleansings) or prosperity of the community. Notice that the source of the fear does not 
need to be specified, meaning that fear imposed on an ethnic group, regardless of whether it 
comes from another group that is directly in conflict with or not, will have similar effects 
because reaction is not necessarily targeted to the source of the fear. In other words, when A 
JURXSRUJRYHUQPHQWPDNHV%JURXSIHHOYXOQHUDEOH&JURXS·VSURYRNLQJDFWLRQPLJKWOHDG
WR%JURXS·VYLROHQFH 
MISPERCEPTION. The likelihood of misperception, according to the inner logic of the 
security dilemma, should strongly correlate with the severity of the security dilemma, because 
if information flows freely without any distortion, ethnic groups can easily recognize opposing 
SDUWLHV·true intentions and seek peaceful solutions, rather than resorting to means that are 
conducive to violence, such as building arms. 
FIRST STRIKE ADVANTAGE. Melander gives a convincing argument why first strike 
advantage is important to the operation of the VHFXULW\GLOHPPD´7KHDUJXPHQWJRHVWKDWZKHQ
                                                                                                                          
25  Posen 1991.    
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different ethnic groups are interspersed in the same territory each side becomes extremely 
vulnerable to attacks from WKHRWKHUµDQGWKXVLQHWKQLFDOO\GLYHUVHDUHDVDGYDQWDJHZLOl be 
gained if one group strikes first.26 The underlying logic is that ethnic groups will be more likely 
to use preemptive strike to secure its regional position;; otherwise, its power will be undermined 
if other ethnic groups strike first. I decided to include the same indicator used by Melander for 
first strike advantage, which is ethnoterritorial dominance.  
 
Variable Operationalization 
The work to transform variables into measurable indicators can be difficult because they 
all have multiple theoretical dimensions with substantial abstractions. I admit that my 
operationalization of the variables cannot fully capture what those concepts represent, but there 
is some significant improvement from previous models. Minority at Risk project has collected 
and compiled quantitative data for a variety of variables related to the characteristics and 
activities of ethnic groups, which I use for most variables in this study.  
 
Independent Variables 
Anarchy: The World Bank has developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators to 
measure governance and institutional quality. Among those indicators, Government 
(IIHFWLYHQHVV´FDSWXULQJSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHTXDOLW\RISXEOLFVHUYLFHVWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHFLYLO
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and tKHFUHGLELOLW\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VFRPPLWPHQWWRVXFK
SROLFLHVµDQG5HJXODWRU\4XDOLW\´FDSWXULQJSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHDELOLW\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQWWR
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
VHFWRUGHYHORSPHQWµDUHWKHEHVWDYDLODEOHTXDQWLWDWLYHLQGLFDWRUVRIDQDUFK\in an ethnic 
security dilemma context.27 In addition, they are perception-­based instead of objective 
evaluation of governments and therefore are more compatible with a constructivist view of 
anarchy. I recode these two indicators into one variable, and a lower score indicates higher 
anarchy.  
                                                                                                                          
26 Melander 1999, 81. 
27 Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo 2010, 4. 
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Fear: Melander argues that institutionalized democracy will produce less fear during 
periods of political transition and therefore he uses democracy as an indicator of fear (measured 
in the polity3d dataset).28 In addition, democracy may well measure the importance of political 
institutions rather than fear. Political institutions play an important role in group conflict within 
a state, so its mitigating effect is expected. Therefore, a more coherent indicator for fear must be 
found, which, by itself, has no apparent explanatory power of ethnic violence. While restrictions 
on language or religion are very good indicators of fear, they have the same problem as 
´GHPRFUDF\.µ  Shifting focus from the external factors that might produce fear, I believe cultural 
grievances, which are a clear indication of the cultural fear that ethnic groups have experienced, 
represent the first two kinds of fear. On the other hand, I will use urbanity to measure the third 
NLQG:LOOLDP5RVHH[DPLQHV0RQLF7RIW·VZRUNRIWKHLQWHUHVWLQJOLQNEHWZHHQVHWWOHment 
patterns and rebellion. Rose GHULYHVDQLPSRUWDQWREVHUYDWLRQIURP7RIW·VILQGLQJWKDW´ZLWK
stronger ties to the land and concomitant decision to remain, rural residents will likely react to 
SRVVLEOHWKUHDWVZLWKPRUHIHDUWKDQXUEDQLWLHVµ29  Thus, the higher the proportion of urban 
population, the less fear of physical survival within a given geological area. Both cultural 
JULHYDQFHDQGXUEDQLWLHVFDQEHHDVLO\RSHUDWLRQDOL]HGZLWK´FXOWXUDOJULHYDQFHµDQG´XUEDQ-­
UXUDOGLVWULEXWLRQµYariables in the Minority at Risk dataset. 
Misperception: While there is no perfect measure of what degree to which ethnic 
JURXSVZLOOPLVSHUFHLYHDQRWKHUSDUW\·VLQWHQWLRQVDGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVLQGH[EHVWVHUYHVWKLV
function. If one ethnic group is sufficiently different from another one in terms of language, 
FXVWRPVWUDGLWLRQLWZLOOEHGLIILFXOWWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHRWKHUSDUW\·VLQWHQWLRQV&KDQQHOVRI
obstructed information or actual occurrences of misperceptions are not measured here, rather 
the likelihood of their occurrences.  Misperception is operationalized by combining two 
LQGLFDWRUVLQ0D5GDWDVHW´ODQJXDJHµDQG´FXVWRPµYDULDEOHZKHUHKLJKHUVFRUHVLQGLFDWH
more distinct languages spoken and customs held between ethnic groups. 
First Strike Advantage7KLVYDULDEOHZLOOEHRSHUDWLRQDOL]HGLQWR´WKHSURSRUWLRQRI 
JURXSPHPEHUVLQUHJLRQDOEDVHµLQ0D5 
Dependent Variables 
                                                                                                                          
28 Melander 1999. 
29 Rose 2011, 14. 
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Two different types of ethnic violence are separately measured. Intercommunal conflict 
is conflict with other ethnic groups that are not state representatives or dominant groups 
exercising power. Rebellion, in contrast, requires the opposing ethnic group to be the dominant 
group in power. My main dependent variable will be Violence, which is the combined score of 
´LQWHUFRPPXDOFRQIOLFWµDQG´UHEHOOLRQµDOWKRXJKWKHWZRZLOOEHUXQDVGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVLQ
separate models for comparative purposes. 
 
Control Variables 
Several control variables will be used in various models, includiQJ´LQGH[RIORVW
SROLWLFDODXWRQRP\µ$87/267´VHSDUDWLVPLQGH[µ6(3;´SROLWLFDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQGH[µ
32/',6´HFRQRPLFGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQGH[µ(&',6´JURXSRUJDQL]DWLRQIRUMRLQWSROLWLFDO
DFWLRQµ*2-3$7KHVHYDULDEOHVDOOIURP0D5DUHVHOHcted such that they can capture a wide 
range of possible explanations of ethnic violence.  
 
Regression Models 
The following are the regression models used to test my hypothesis.  
Model 1:  
9LROHQFH´LQWHUFRPPXQDOµ´UHEHOOLRQµ $QDUFK\8UEDQ5XUDO'LVWULEXWLRQ&XOWXUDO
Grivance+Misperception index+Proportion of members in regional base 
+AUTLOST+SEPX+POLDIS+ECDIS+GOJPA  
Model 1 includes the four main variables and all control variables. My main focus on 
this model will be the significance of each variable and the overall validity of this model.  
 
Model 2: 
Violence =Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception 
index+Proportion of member in regional base 
Model 2 is designed to measure the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma 
by examining the R square. 
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Model 3: 
Intercommunal conflict=Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception 
index+Proportion of members in regional base 
 
Model 4: 
Rebellion=Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception 
index+Proportion of member in regional base 
 
Only the dependent variable in Model 3 and 4 differs from Model 2. I break down 
violence into two distinct types of ethnic violence to see how an anarchic situation will act 
differently upon them.  Intercommunal conflict should be more prevailing than rebellion given 
any anarchic level since rebellion factors into government control. It is also a way to test the 
internal validity of the anarchy variable. 
 
Model 5: 
Restraint Breakdown=Ethnoterritorial Dominance+Democracy+Political Grievance 
 
In this model, I mimiF0HODQGHU·VUHVHDUFKPRGHODVPXFKDVSRVVLEOHH[FHSWWKDWDOOWKH
data I use is from 2005 (including the use of Polity IV dataset30), ZKLOH0HODQGHU·VGDWDLVIURP
1990 to 1994.31 This regression model will not only provide a longitudinal study comparison, 
but also put my model in a comparative context. Several noticeable differences exist in my 
operationalization: 1) Melander uses 70% as the threshold for ethnoterritorial dominance, while 
I use 75% due to coding changes in the MaR dataset. However, the difference is negligible and 
should have minimal impact on my analysis. 2) I substitute separatist grievance for political 
grievance, which is the closest variable available. According to the new code book, a level of 
political grievance at three or four represents JULHYDQFHVIRFXVHGRQ´FUHDWLQJRUVWUHQJWKHQLQJ
DXWRQRPRXVVWDWXVµDQG´FUHDWLQJ DVHSDUDWHVWDWHIRUJURXSRUUHYDQFKLVWFKDQJHLQERDUGHUVµ
respectively.32 It is comparable to the original indicator of Status Quo Utility. 3) Coding for 
                                                                                                                          
30 Polity IV Project 2010. 
31 Melander 1999. 
32 Minority at Risk 2009, 14.  
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restraint breakdown should have only included cases of intercommunal conflict with a score of 
5 and that have at least 500 casualties. However, a case by case determination of restraint 
EUHDNGRZQE\H[DPLQLQJHDFKFRQIOLFW·VFDVXDOW\QXPEHUVLVLPSRVVLEOHIRUWKLVUHVHDUFK, and 
this information is not readily available in any database. Therefore I suppose a limited number 
of cases may be inappropriately coded.  
DATA ANALYSIS 
Results 
Table 1: Regression Results for Model 1 to 4 
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Violence 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
-­0.212 2.504*** 1.937*** 0.76* 
(0.913) (0.795) (0.509) (0.429) 
Anarchy 
-­.98 -­0.152 (-­0.088) -­0.067 
(.100) (0.102) 0.066 (0.057) 
Misperception 
-­0.017 0.132 0.028 0.062 
-­0.205 (0.216) (0.138) (0.118) 
Urban rural distribution  
-­.050 -­0.131 -­0.096 -­0.062 
(.133) (0.141) (0.091) (0.079) 
Cultural grievance  
-­.345 -­0.263 -­0.086 -­0.156 
(.243) (0.244) (0.156) (0.137) 
Regional base-­-­proportion 
of group members  
0.071 0.157 -­0.085 0.21*** 
(.144) (0.137) (0.088) (0.076) 
Index of lost political 
autonomy 
-­0.05     
(.215)     
Separatism index  
-­0.108     
(0.192)     
Political grievance  
0.237     
(.185)     
Political discrimination 
index  
0.093     
(.164)     
Economic discrimination 
index  
0.112     
(.178)     
Group organization for 
joint political action  
0.881***     
(.187)     
R-­squared 0.207 0.051 0.022 0.08 
Adjusted R-­squared 0.167 0.03 0.001 0.06 
Significance .000 0.037 0.399 0.001 
Note: standard errors in parentheses;; *p≤.1, **p≤.05, ***p≤.01 
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Since ethnic conflict is a complex phenomenon, it is not surprising that even though ten 
different variables are included in the first model, they only explain twenty one percent of the 
variance. None of the variables are significant except group organization for joint political 
action, which is not only significant at a 0.001 level, but also has the strongest effect on violence 
in the equation. All four main variables intended to operationalize the security dilemma are far 
from any significance level and thus cannot yield any meaningful interpretations. 
 Model 2 is significant at .05 level, however, the individual variables are not significant. 
In addition, the R2 value is very low, meaning that the equation has little predictive or 
explanatory power for ethnic violence. Standardized coefficients of all variables have expected 
signs, indicating that my theoretical expectations are correct.  A closer observation reveals that 
anarchy carries the most weight in the regression.  
 Model 3 is not significant, and intercommunal violence is hardly explained by the 
model. Model 4 explains eight percent of the variance in rebellion, which is mostly contributed 
by the proportion of group members in regional bases (first strike advantage). This variable is 
significant at the .01 level. A regionally dispersed ethnic group is more likely to have ethnic 
conflict with a central authority that represents another ethnic group.  
The insignificance of my main variables is not a result of multicollinearity.  According to 
the correlation matrix (Table 2), none of variables strongly associate with each other.  
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Main Variables 
  Anarchy Misperception 
Cultural 
grievance  
Proportion 
of group 
members  
Urban 
rural 
distribution  
Anarchy 1 -­0.082 .261** -­.253** .346** 
Misperception -­0.082 1 0.067 0.042 -­.248** 
Cultural 
grievance  .261
** 0.067 1 -­.148* 0.08 
Proportion of 
group 
members  
-­.253** 0.042 -­.148* 1 -­.382** 
Urban rural 
distribution  .346
** -­.248** 0.08 -­.382** 1 
Note: **p≤.01, *p≤.05 (2-­tailed). 
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 Table WKUHHVKRZV0HODQGHU·VPRGHOXVLQJFRPSDUDEOHGDWDIURPGLIIHUHQWWLPHV,Q
terms of R square0HODQGHU·VPRGHOGRHVQRWKDYHDQ\EHWWHUUHVXOWV7KH5VTXDUHLV%, 
very close to that of model 2. Political grievance has the most substantial effect on the 
dependent variable, as it did in 1994 model. In addition, it is significant at 0.001 level. This data 
suggests that the security dilemma theory has declined in explanatory power.  
Table 3: Regression Results for Melander's Original Model and Model 5 
Dependent Variable: Restraint Breakdown 
Independent 
Variable Original Model 5 
Constant 
-­.652 0.054 
(0.653) (0.034) 
Democracy 
-­2.8*** -­0.006 
(1.075) (0.03) 
Ethnoterritorial Dom. 
-­3.249*** 0.024 
(1.191) (0.039) 
Separatist (Political) 
Grievances 
.9511*** 0.148*** 
(.836) (0.044) 
R-­squared .507 .056 
Significance .000 .002 
N 85 284 
1RWHVWDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVSSS33 
Research limitations 
As discussed previously, I encountered many difficulties when trying to operationalize 
the ethnic security dilemma concept. Thus, one must take into account limitations of my 
research design when interpreting the results. A salient problem is partial measurement, as 
indicators cannot fully capture the ethnic security dilemma phenomenon in its entirety. As a 
result, R square values may be underestimated. In addition, a better time series analysis should 
also retrospectively apply my regression model to the 1990-­1994 data. In addition, although 
MaR is a very inclusive database to study ethnic conflicts, it has its own case selection criteria 
that might exclude some important cases. 
                                                                                                                          
33  Results of original research model compiled from Melander 1999.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Preliminary analysis of the data allows me to derive several observations. First, my data 
does not support the hypothesis that the greater the presence of ethnic security dilemma 
conditions, the more severe the ethnic violence. The research model, based on my ways of 
operationalizing the ethnic security dilemma, suggests that ethnic violence is hardly explained 
by the theory. FurthermoreHWKQLFVHFXULW\GLOHPPD·VH[SODQDWRU\SRZHUKDVVXEVWDQWLDOO\
dropped from the previous research. 
Do these observations imply that the ethnic security dilemma approach to studying 
ethnic conflict is unlikely to produce fruitful results in the future? Given the limitations of this 
research, I am hesitant to give a positive answer. However, if I supplement the quantitative 
results with a normative analysis, the answer becomes clearer. The two questions I will try to 
answer in the following analysis are: why is the HWKQLFVHFXULW\GLOHPPD·VH[SODQDWRU\SRZHU
likely limited to case studies of large scale violence, and what might be the reasons that the 
theory has become a less compelling explanation of ethnic violence in recent years? 
To answer the first question, we need to revisit how the ethnic security dilemma works. 
The entire causal mechanism is about perception and misperception.  It is possible that in some 
cases, even given the preconditions of the ethnic security dilemma, they will not ultimately fall 
into a vicious cycle of action and reaction. In other words, the security dilemma can be 
measured in a continuous scale, but there is a threshold beyond which ethnic violence is 
triggered.  Putting this theoretical explanation at a variable level, we can expect that only if 
anarchy, fear, and first strike advantage are large enough that they will have substantial impact 
on ethnic group behaviors.  Thus the relationship between ethnic security dilemma and ethnic 
violence is non-­linear.  
In addition, the security dilemma is a broad conceptual frame used to think about the 
inner dynamics of how conflict arises and its path to some larger violence. A case study or 
content analysis that fit relevant factual information into this theory framework may give a 
better holistic picture of what happens for a given conflict dyad.  
The research design of Melander incorporates the possibility of a non-­linear relationship 
between the ethnic security dilemma and ethnic violence by making specific cutoffs in coding 
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independent variables and dependent variables and transforming them into dummy variables. 
So naturally we have to ask, given that model 5 only examines ethnic violence on a discrete 
scale, why has the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma is still remained very low, 
and in fact, has decreased significantly from previous years of study? 
To answer this question, we need to examine the theory in a larger context. As a matter 
of fact, the number of ethnic wars (large-­scale violence) in the new century dramatically 
dropped compared to that of the early 1990s. As Ted Gurr points out: 
´«0DQ\QHZPXOWLHWKQLFGHPRFUDFLHVKDYHEHHQFRQVROLGDWHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOGRFWULQH
and practices for containing deadly ethnic conflict have been evolved. The UN, regional 
organizations in Europe and Africa, and major powers have become more proactive in 
answering ethnic quarrels. The net effect has been not to put an end to ethnic conflict but 
rather to contain some of its worst consequences and to channel the political energies of 
mobilized ethnic groups into conventional politics.µ34 
The ethnic security dilemma theory was originally used to examine ethnic violence in 
post-­imperial and post-­Cold War periods. However, unlike 20 years ago, the political 
environment of both states and international society are less likely to produce a security 
dilemma because mechanisms in place will not allow situations of a minor anarchic situation to 
materialize into a major ethnic security dilemma.  
Figure 1 is a linear regression model consistent with our research approach. But as 
discussed earlier, the relationship might be better represented in the graph 2 and 3 discrete 
models where less severe ethnic security dilemma does not cause ethnic violence but when the 
severity of our independent variable passes certain point, it becomes strongly correlated with 
ethnic violence.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
34  Minority at Risk 2009, 14. 
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Figure 1: Linear model 
 
The differences in preconditions of the security dilemma and the occurrence of ethnic 
violence between two different times is demonstrated. In Graph 2, data is evenly spread along 
combinations of mild ethnic security dilemma-­ ethnic violence and severe ethnic security 
dilemma-­VHYHUHHWKQLFYLROHQFHZKHUHRXUOLQHVOLH7KHUHIRUH0HODQGHU·VPRGHOLVYDOLGLQ
explaining a large part of the variance. However, in more recent years, conflicts clustered 
mainly around the lower ends of both spectrums of ethnic violence and security dilemma where 
the model has little explanatory power. 
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Figure 2: 1994 Discrete Model (Melander original)     Figure 3: 2005 Discrete Model (Model 5) 
 
Note: the graphs do not use any actual cases to plot the data points. They are hypothetical 
situations used for theoretical illustration purpose only. 
 
 This qualitative analysis provides possible explanations for my observations of the 
quantitative datad as well as strengthens the conclusion of this study. Therefore, future research 
should cautiously analyze the case at hand in order to make a sound decision about the 
methodology that will be used in a study. As I point out, changes in a variety of factors may 
have rendered the ethnic security dilemma theory, to some extent, obsolete. Thus, a mass 
quantitative application is unlikely to provide meaningful insight in the future.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: FACTORS AND FACTIONS 
Timothy Luby 
 
Abstract: In recent years the environment has become an increasingly salient issue, with many citizens 
calling for higher environmental protection and precautions within the United States. However, it seems 
that congressmen have become unresponsive to these demands as partisanship progressively becomes the 
determining factor in environmental voting. This study attempts to discover what factors, along with 
party, determine a rHSUHVHQWDWLYH·VYRWLQJGHFLVLRQVRQHQYLURQPHQWDOOHJLVODWLRQ%\FROOHFWLQJGDWDRQ
United States House members in 2006, 2007, and 2010 and running linear regressions, the most 
significant factors in predicting House members· voting patterns are identified;; however, party and 
ideology seem to have increasingly become the most crucial factors in determining environmental voting 
decisions.  
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years we have witnessed an unprecedented increase in partisanship, especially 
at the national level.1 More and more often, legislators vote with their parties, with liberal 
Republicans and conservative Democrats quickly becoming extinct.2 As this trend of party 
voting continues, it is important to understand what other key factors, along with party, are 
influencing a legislator·VYRWLQJGHFLVLRQs. Additionally, within the past decade the 
environment has become an increasingly salient issue, with many citizens calling for higher 
environmental protection and precautions within the United States.3 In a recent study done by 
Davis and Wurth, it was found that the environment is an issue that has a significant impact on 
FLWL]HQV· evaluations of candidates and is also a factor that cuts across constituency party 
inclinations.4 That being said, the voting patterns of legislators on environmental issues in a 
partisan congress, with a constituency that is not divided in clear party terms, needs further 
investigation.  What factors have the greatest effect on UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV· environmental voting 
decisions? Measuring the factors that influence House members· voting decisions on a matter 
where constituencies do not always fall into the clear party divide is important because a 
cleaner and more sustainable environment is something all constituents want for their districts. 
                                                                                                                          
1 Grose et al. 2003. 
2 Bond and Fleisher 1996. 
3 Dalton 2005. 
4 Davis and Wurth 2003.  
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Therefore, finding out what factors can increase the legislation passed for such an outcome is an 
essential issue.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing research shows that at the national level, partisanship within the United 
States Congress has dramatically increased within the past decade and party is one of the most 
important factors in congressional voting. In a study by Richard Fleisher, it was found that by 
WKHVWDUWRI3UHVLGHQW5HDJDQ·VVHFRQGWHUPLQWKH+RXVHKDGEHFRPHRYHUZKHOPLQJO\
partisan. By defining presidents as either minority (when the president does not have a majority 
of party members in Congress) or majority presidents (when the president has a majority in 
Congress), evidence showed that increased partisanship affected presidential-­congressional 
relations. As Congress became more partisan, presidential support from factions within the 
SUHVLGHQW·VSDUW\ increased, while support from factions of the opposition decreased.5 In other 
words, as partisanship increased, liberal Republicans were less likely to vote in accordance with 
a Democratic president, and conservative Democrats were less likely to vote with a Republican 
president. Moreover, it has been found that parties have become so strong in Congress that the 
majority party can control the agenda in the legislature, screening out bills that divide their 
party and devoting more floor time to bills in its favor.6 
Party has also become a chief predictor in national elections when constituency 
preferences are controlled for.7 However, this phenomenon is contrary to the theoretical design 
of representation, in that congressmen are supposed to take the position at the median of their 
respective constituency. Yet, with most Americans failing to act on their preferences at the polls, 
it is no surprise that they are not represented by their legislator, but rather the party·V 
preferences.8 Trying to establish where the demand for environmental legislation works into the 
House now can prove to be difficult. While the environment is important to many Americans, 
establishing how legislators address the environment is the question we are posed with.9 
Nonetheless, it has been shown that as a demand for environmental amenities increases, (as 
measured by environmental group membership within a district) pro-­environmental voting 
behavior also increases in the legislature;; however, more often than not, environmental 
                                                                                                                          
5 Bond and Fleisher 1996. 
6 Cox et al. 2010. 
7 Grose et al. 2003. 
8 Akhmetkarimov and Bulat 2008. 
9  Davis and Wurth 2003.  
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legislation is only passed when the costs are not borne by individuals within the legislator·V
political jurisdiction.10 Findings such as this are reassuring, in that maybe representatives do 
indeed take note of their constituHQWV·GHPDQGVHYHQLIWKH\RQO\UHVSRQGZKHQLWLVPRQHWDULO\
convenient.  
Discovering the types of people who are willing to pay more for environmental 
programs within their communities is very important. In a 1999 study examining the household 
value of a curbside recycling program, it was found that many different factors will increase or 
GHFUHDVHDSHUVRQ·VOLNHOLKRRGWRSD\PRUHIRUSUR-­environmental programs. Through 
contingent valuation techniques and the use of phone surveys, the research found the variables 
WKDWKDYHWKHJUHDWHVWHIIHFWRQDQLQGLYLGXDO·VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\IRUWKHHQYLURQPHQW:RPHQ
people with higher incomes, young people, and people with a higher education all value the 
environment more than their counterparts.11 This research shows that individuals value the 
environment differently, and by the same logic, different districts that vary in social 
demographics should also value the environment differently.  
This paper explores how factors, such as the ones above, affect representDWLYHV·voting 
decisions on environmental issues. While there is a wealth of literature demonstrating that 
party is the key predictor of a legislator·s voting behavior, little research has been done on what 
variables other than party can predict single issue voting on the environment, and this research 
will attempt to fill that gap.  
DESIGN 
  This research examines the environmental voting behavior in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the extent to which it varies with characteristics of the representatives 
themselves and their districts. The years 2006, 2007, and 2010 will be used to compare the 
changes in predictive variables over time. These three years were selected for this study because 
they include presidents of different parties in both the minority and majority. That is to say, 
George Bush in 2006 as a Republican majority president, Bush in 2007 as a minority president, 
and Barack Obama in 2010, as a Democratic majority president. For each of the three years, a 
separate equation will be run with the same independent variables to control for the changes in 
                                                                                                                          
10 Anderson 2011;; Hussain and Laband 2004. 
11 Aadland and Caplan 1999.  
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presidency and time. The data were collected from the Almanac of American Politics by Michael 
%DURQHDQGWKH/HDJXHRI&RQVHUYDWLRQ9RWHUV·ZHEVLWH$OOdistricts and representatives 
were used within the study, with a few cases missing when a representative was newly elected 
and did not have group ratings, or in the rare case when the seat was vacant. The sum of the 
number of cases for the three years included in the study is 1,210. 
 The dependent variable in this research will be the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 
score a representative receives. This LCV score encompasses what the League of Conservation 
Voters deems the most important environmental bills that made it into Congress, and the 
resulting score a legislator receives is a direct correlation to how he or she voted on the bills. 
The more often a representative voted in favor of the environment, the higher the LCV score the 
representative received. The best possible score is 100, and the worst is zero.  
 Eleven independent variables are included in this study. These include the House 
PHPEHU·VSDUW\DQGJHQGHUWKHDYHUDJHDJHDQGLQFRPHRIWKHGLVWULFWWKHSHUFHQWDJHRI
people with a college education in the district, percent vote for John Kerry in 2004 in the district, 
the percentage of people that live in rural areas within the district, and the percent of people 
that hold blue collar jobs within the district. Lastly, dummy variables for the region of the 
district include: South and non-­VRXWKDQGWKHSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHRIDVWDWHXVLQJ'DQLHO(OD]DU·V 
political culture categorization. States can be categorized as moralistic, individualistic, or 
WUDGLWLRQDOLVWLFXVLQJ(OD]DU·VPRGHO0RUDOLVWLFVWDWHVVHHSROLWLFVDVDPHDQVWRKHOSWKHZHOO-­ 
being of everyone within a society, individualistic states see politics as a business, and 
traditionalistic states rely on the customs of the upper-­class elites to keep the control they have 
always had in politics.12  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1: The party of the House members will have the greatest effect on the LCV score, regardless 
of the year, with Republicans being more likely to have lower LVC scores than Democrats.   
As much of the existing literature shows, party is one of, if not the most important, predictors of 
a legislator·VYRWH7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\ true within the recent years this study examines, as 
Congress has become increasingly more partisan with time. 
                                                                                                                          
12 Elazar 1999. 
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Hypothesis 2: Female representatives will be more likely to have higher LCV scores than males.  
This expectation is in accordance with the existing literature that women are often more 
sympathetic to environmental issues than males.13  
Hypothesis 3: House members within districts that have higher incomes will be more likely to have higher 
LCV scores than members in lower income districts. 
Studies have shown that aVDQLQGLYLGXDO·VLQFRPHULVHV demand for a better environment rises 
with it.14 This is because when individuals need not worry about their immediate needs such as 
food and rent, they are more willing to spend money on the environment.15   
Hypothesis 4: House members with lower median ages within their districts will be more likely to have 
higher LCV scores than members in districts with higher median ages.  
This expectation is consistent with the literature that states that young people (people between 
the ages of 18 and 34) will on average have a higher demand for environmental protection than 
older generations.16  
Hypothesis 5: As the percentage of people holding college degrees in a district increases, the LCV score of 
its House member will also increase. 
Past research has shown that as education increases, DQLQGLYLGXDO·VGHPDQGIRUHQYLURQPHQWDO
protection increases.17 
Hypothesis 6: $VWKHSHUFHQWDJHRI´EOXHFROODUµZRUNHUVLQDGLVWULFWLncreases, the LCV score of its 
House member will decrease.   
As stated earlier, when the environment is viewed in terms of economic trade-­offs and not in 
WKHVHQVHRI´EX\LQJWKHHQYLURQPHQWµWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHHQYLURQPHQWLVPXWHG7KH
rationale behind this expectation is that blue collar workers will more often think of 
environmental programs in terms of an economic trade-­off and will not demand environmental 
policies within their districts.  
 
                                                                                                                          
13 Aadland and Caplan 1999. 
14 McConnell 1997;; Morse 2008. 
15 Aadland and Caplan 1999. 
16 Arnold et al. 2009.  
17 Quimby and Angelique 2011.  
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Hypothesis 7: As the percent vote for Kerry in the district increases, the LCV score of the House member 
will also increase. 
Districts with a higher percent vote for Kerry will be more ideologically left than districts with a 
lower percent vote for Kerry. This in turn would mean that districts with a greater Kerry vote 
are also more likely to have a representative who is a Democrat and votes in favor of 
environmental legislation;; this justification is consistent with hypothesis one.  
Hypothesis 8:  House members in states with moralistic political cultures will be more likely to have 
higher LCV scores than members who are in traditionalistic and individualistic states.  
As mentioned earlier, the moralistic political culture views politics as a way to benefit everyone 
in a society. One of the ways a society can receive altruistic benefits is through increasing the 
environmental welfare of a district. That being said, according to Elazar, the House of 
Representatives members within the moralistic states should be more likely vote in favor of the 
environment.  
Hypothesis 9: Party will have a more substantial effect on LCV vote when a majority president is in 
power compared to when a minority president is in power.  
When the president has a majority within the house, he has the ability to get more of his bills 
passed. With this advantageous ability, I expect that the minority party will coalesce together 
and maintain party unity to try and stop the majority from passing bills. In response, the 
majority party will also band together to ensure the passing of bills. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 1: Liner Regression for 2006, 2007, and 2010 
Dependent Variable: LCV score 
Independent 
Variable 
2006 2007 2010 
Constant -­40.572** 
(.042) 
23.342*** 
(.070) 
70.462* 
.000 
Representative 
Party 
-­54.442* 
(.000) 
-­.667 
-­58.077* 
(.000) 
-­.743 
-­69.411* 
(.000) 
-­.843 
Representative 
Gender 
4.710* 
(.087) 
.042 
.425 
(.852) 
.425 
-­.842 
(.496) 
-­.012 
Age of 
District 
.987** 
(.010) 
-­.74 
.023 
(.610) 
.011 
.036 
(.373) 
.015 
Percent College 
Grad 
.305 
(.175) 
.074 
.196 
(.297) 
.050 
-­.018 
(.914) 
-­.004 
 
South 
-­7.487 
(.147) 
-­.086 
-­8.089*** 
(.064) 
-­.098 
3.824 
.044 
.284 
 
Income 
.000** 
(.001) 
.148 
.000** 
(.002) 
.123 
.000 
(.698) 
.013 
Percent Vote 
Kerry 
.713* 
(.000) 
.255 
.595* 
(.000) 
.226 
.333* 
(.000) 
.117 
Percent 
Rural 
 
-­.075 
(.328) 
-­.037 
.047 
(.412) 
.025 
-­0.62 
(.209) 
-­.031 
Percent  
Blue Collar 
 
.737** 
(.028) 
.106 
.213 
(.429) 
.033 
-­.315 
(.184) 
-­.045 
Moralistic 
Political Culture 
 
3.488 
(.158) 
.039 
1.908 
(.348) 
.023 
.862 
(.681) 
.010 
Individualistic 
Political Culture 
.585 
(.912) 
-­007 
-­1.713 
(.698) 
-­.021 
.5235 
(.150) 
.062 
Note: Significance in parenthesis and beta weights italicized;; SSS 
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In 2006, the adjusted R square is .787 and the standard error of the estimate is 18.850 
percent.  First and foremost, representative party is unquestionably having the greatest effect of 
all the variables in the equation. Party is the strongest predicting variable (beta weight of -­.667) 
and was statistically significant at the .001 level. The B value indicates the per unit change in 
party (moving from a value of 0 for Democrats to a value of 1 for Republicans) has a -­54.442 
effect on LCV scores. Representative gender is also a significant predictor of LCV scores. 
Women are more likely to have higher LCV scores by almost 5 points, holding all other 
variables constant.  Average age of the constituents in a district also has a positive effect on LCV 
scores. This relationship shows that as a district grows older, the amount of environmental 
legislation passed by its House member increases. Average income also has a positive effect on 
LCV scores. The incomes of the districts were at such wide ranges that the unstandardized 
coefficient did not capture the effect of per unit change in income on LCV scores. However, 
looking at the beta weight (.148), there is a positive relationship between the average income of 
DGLVWULFWDQGWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ+RXVHPHPEHU·V/&9VFRUH7he percentage vote for Kerry has 
the strongest effect on LCV scores after party, and is also the only other variable in the model 
significant at past the .001 level. Representatives of districts with a higher percent Kerry vote are 
also more likely to have higher LCV scores. Lastly, the percentage of workers holding a blue 
collar job in a district has a positive statistically significant relationship with LCV score. The 
region, percent of the rural population, and political culture variables are not statistically 
significant in this model.   
In 2007, the adjusted R square is .841 and the standard error of the estimate is 15.404 
percent.  In the model for this year, fewer of the independent variables are statistically 
significant. However, the model still explains about 84% of the variance in the equation. Of the 
eleven variables, only 4 are statistically significant: party (p<.000), income (p<.002), percent vote 
for Kerry (p<.000), and South (p<.064). Once again, party is the strongest variable with a beta of 
-­.743 and a B value of -­58.077. Note that in this model, party is having an even greater effect on 
LCV scores than in the previous model. Average income of a district, again, has a positive effect 
on LCV scores. Percent Kerry vote for the second time had a positive relationship with the LCV 
scores, having a B value of .595, and the second greatest a beta weight of .226. The final variable, 
South, has a B value of -­8.089, showing a negative relationship;; House Representatives that are 
in the south (1) are more likely to have lower LCV scores than Representatives in the north (0). 
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In 2006, the gender, age, and blue collar variables are all statistically significant, but are no 
longer in 2007. That being said, of the three variables in 2007 that are also statistically significant 
in 2006, only the party variable increased its relative impact while the others diminished.  
In 2010, the adjusted R square is .878 and the standard error of the estimate is 14.185 
percent.  However, even though the model is explaining almost 90% of the variance, only two 
variables are statistically significant in 2010: party and percent vote for Kerry, both at the .001 
level. Party became an even stronger predictor than in 2007, with a B value of -­69.411. 
Furthermore, the percent vote for Kerry, again, has the second highest a beta weight of .117 and 
a B value of .333.  In this 2010 model, income is statistically insignificant, whereas in the 
previous two models it is a strong predictor. Looking at the significance of the variables in this 
2010 model, all of the variables that were significant in the previous years, aside from party and 
Kerry vote, now are insignificant. For example, age in the 2006 model was significant at the .01 
level, yet in 2010 the p-­value grew to .373. While all the variables but party and Kerry vote were 
statistically insignificant in 2010, the degree to which this insignificance increased is to be noted. 
  
DISCUSSION 
There is a clear trend as the study progresses through the three years, showing that 
party becomes gradually more important, with an increase in B values of 14.969 between 2006 
and 2010. Moreover, the effects of once statistically significant variables are muted by the 
increasing effect of party in the equation. Even the B value of percent vote for Kerry 
progressively decreases as the years advance. This suggests that ideologically diverse 
constituencies, for example those where Kerry or Bush had marginal victories, are being 
underrepresented because their House members are voting solely along party lines more and 
PRUHRIWHQ$VIDFWRUVWKDWRQFHSOD\HGDUROHLQWKHGHFLVLRQSURFHVVRI+RXVHPHPEHUV·
environmental voting scores are phased out for party preferences, the diverse demands of 
constituencies throughout the country are being ignored.  By 2010 we are left with only party 
and the percent vote for Kerry as the sole statistically significant variables in predicting a House 
PHPEHU·V LCV score.   
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CONCLUSION  
The results from this investigative analysis of LCV voting scores within the House of 
Representatives show the increasing amount of partisanship within Congress in recent years. 
This finding is consistent with hypothesis one and the previous literature;; however, the fact that 
the relative impact of party is consistently increasing disproves hypothesis nine, in that party 
did not have the greatest effect when majority presidents were in office (2006 and 2010). 
Hypotheses two, three, and four were confirmed in the year 2006, and in 2007 for hypothesis 
three, but failed to make a significant impact in 2010. This was likely due to the immense 
increase in partisanship that was found in 2010. Inconsistent with conventional wisdom, the 
education level of the constituency  did not have a significant impact on LCV scores. In all three 
years, the percentage of people holding a college degree in a district did not influence House 
PHPEHUV·decisions, thus disproving hypothesis five.  Hypothesis six was not verified, because 
increases in blue collar workers had a positive effect on LCV scores in 2006, working in the 
opposite direction than predicted;; however, it was not statistically significant in 2007 or 2010. 
Hypothesis seven, the percent vote for Kerry will have a positive relationship with LCV scores, 
was confirmed in all three regression analyses;; however, as stated earlier, its effect on LCV 
scores diminished gradually as the years progressed. Lastly, Hypothesis eight was unconfirmed 
in this study, showing that political culture did not have an effect on LCV scores.  
From this study, the conventional wisdom that party is the greatest predictor of a 
legislator·VYRWHFDQEe further reinforced. The regression models show that between the years 
of 2006-­2010, the House of Representatives has become increasingly partisan. These findings 
suggest that House members will typically not take into account the diversity of their 
constituents, and instead will vote solely with their respective party. If the trend found in this 
research continues, valuable differences in districts will not be represented.  
To further investigate the partisanship trend in Congress, more years could be included 
in future studies. Additionally, looking at other group ratings aside from LCV scores (for 
example National Tax Payer Union, American Conservative Union , etc.) and the relationship 
they have with the same independent variables would investigate if the increased partisanship 
is also being displayed in other policy areas other than the environment.  
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The House of Representatives plays a vital role in representing diverse groups of people 
within the states. Nevertheless, the recent trends of extreme partisanship show a decline in the 
representation of diverse districts, reflecting almost a dichotomous system where once a House 
member is elected, solely the values of his or her party will be represented in Washington.  
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THE PERSONALITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES: ANALYZING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN MYERS-­BRIGGS PERSONALITY TYPES AND POLITICAL VIEWS 
Tracy Lytwyn 
 
Abstract: For political scientists and politicians alike, much research has been devoted to understanding 
the American citizen.  Comprehension is the key to capturing votes, pushing forward new ideas, and 
retaining support in the years to come. This project centers on the theory that people structure their 
political opinions around problem-­solving tendencies that they apply to everyday situations and are 
particular to their personalities. To evaluate this idea, this study uses the Myers-­Briggs Type Indicator 
(1962) in addition to several questions regarding personal policy preferences to determine whether there 
is a significant correlation between certain elements of one's personality type and political ideas. 
Controlling for Intolerance of Ambiguity (Budner 1962), sociodemographic variables, and religiosity, it 
was found that an individual exhibits clear political preferences based on certain parts of personal 
characteristics. The results of this study imply a further fusion of psychology and politics for 
policymakers and voters.  
INTRODUCTION 
  In the discussion of what influences political beliefs, many factors are believed to cause 
variances. Oftentimes, this conversation points to personal aspects such as socioeconomic 
status, education level, and religious beliefs. But what often is neglected in this debate is the role 
of personality in determining how one observes certain ideas as desirable or displeasing. If 
personality is believed to be a significant cause of differences in how a person acts, what 
hobbies or interests he or she has, or how an individual responds to a situation, would it be 
reasonable to believe that personality also plays a role in forming political beliefs? Could it be 
said that people with specific types of personalities display inclinations toward certain political 
ideas? TKLVVWXG\VHHNVWRFDSWXUHZKHWKHUDQLQGLYLGXDO·VFKDUDFWHUWUDLWV and personality serve 
integral roles in the political realm.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  Previous research has already laid groundwork on the discussion of personality and 
political opinions. Not only has it been emphasized that personality is a worthwhile part of the 
political discussion,1 but there have been recorded differences between liberals and 
                                                                                                                          
1 Greenstein 1992. 
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conservatives in various parts of their lives2 and in personality assessments, such as WKH´%LJ
)LYHµSHUVRQDOLW\study3. On the other side of the debate, scholars have pointed to 
sociodemographic variables4, family influence5, and religious values6 as reasons for variation in 
political ideas. 
Fred Cutler (2003) examined how DFDQGLGDWH·Vsociodemographic characteristics 
(gender, language, region of residency) are transferred into YRWHUV· political decision-­making. 
This centered on the idea that voters employs certain heuristics revolving around their 
individual traits to the political arena. &XWOHUDUJXHGWKDWWKRVHZKRIHHODFHUWDLQ´VRFLDO
GLVWDQFHµIURPDSDUWLFXODUFDQGLGDWHRUSDUW\ZLOOEHOHVVOLNHO\WRYRWHIRUWhat candidate, 
meaning that candidates who share a similar sociodemographic background with the voter are 
more likely to win his or her support. To test this, he used survey data from the 1993 and 1997 
Canadian general elections, FRQWUROOLQJIRUYRWHUV·RSLQLRQVRQSDUWLFXODULVVXes that lined up 
with each of the four major parties. Cutler found that shared gender, region, and language were 
decisive factors in these two elections, while shared religion was not as important to voters in 
choosing a candidate. However, the YRWHUV· need to choose candidates who are similar to them 
was cleaUO\LPSRUWDQWDFURVVWKHERDUGLOOXVWUDWLQJWKDWRQH·VVRFLRGHPRJUDSKLFVWDWXVVHUYHGa 
fundamental role in making political decisions. 7 
Beck and Jennings (1991) studied how family influences conWULEXWHWRRQH·VSROLWLFDO
affiliation. To analyze this, they drew from a panel study of young Americans between 1965 and 
1982 involving interviews with high school seniors and their parents to see whether or not 
SDUHQWV·SROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHVWD\VZLWKDFhild as he or she matures. Up until this study, the 
family had been identified as a social identity and location in a social structure for a child, 
which, in turn, affected political affiliation. Beck and Jennings departed from traditional views 
by recognizing that SDUHQWV·SROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHLVDEURDGFRQFHSWUDWKHUWKDQ a one-­on-­one 
interaction. Additionally, they recognized that instead of directly passing down political beliefs, 
family traditions typically generate predispositions toward ideas, which affect views. The study 
FKRVHWRDVVHVVIDPLO\SROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUHE\DQDO\]LQJSDUHQWV·SROLWLFDOLQYROYHPHQWDQGWKHLU
                                                                                                                          
2 Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008. 
3 Hirsh et al. 2010. 
4 Cutler 2003. 
5 Beck and Jennings 1991. 
6 Layman 1997. 
7 Cutler 2003. 
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party affiliation. This research found that for the post-­JHQHUDWLRQSDUHQWV·SROLWLFDO
involvement  (i.e. protests, marches, rallies, etc.) did not transmit directly to their children. 
Overall, it was noted that as the subjects in this study matured, the authority of thHLUSDUHQWV·
party alignment became less important, although it still created predispositions for their own 
personal beliefs.8  
This study will seek to fuse these two ideas together to see if the sociodemographic 
environment an individual is brought up in will affect his or her political predispositions. If 
Cutler recognized that voters connect their gender, region, and language ZLWKDFDQGLGDWH·VLW
may be the case that other personal characteristics will serve as a heuristic for political 
decisions.9 AddLWLRQDOO\LISDUHQWV·SROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHcreates predispositions to WKHLUFKLOG·V 
EHOLHIVDIDPLO\·VVRFLRGHPRJUDSKLFEDFNJURXQGPD\JHQHUDWHits own predispositions.10 To 
test this theory, this study includes family income level and parents·HGXFDWLRQlevel as 
independent variables. 
*HRIIUH\/D\PDQVWXGLHGKRZRQH·VFRPPLWPHQWWRDUHOLJLRQLQIOXHQFHVSDUW\
affiliation, presidential vote choice, and other political decisions. He discovered that the 
relationship between party identification and religiosity was statistically significant. Those who 
considered themselves to be highly committed to a religion were more likely than less religious 
respondents to vote Republican. :KLOHPRVWRI/D\PDQ·VVWXG\IRFXVHGRQWKHSROLWLcal tensions 
within a religion, in regards to doctrinal orthodoxy and political choices, he noted that there 
was an equally considerable tension between religious and nonreligious populations·YRWLQJ
decisions at the time. Even in controlling for attitudes toward specific policy opinions and 
sociodemographic characteristics, this significance remained.11 Therefore, it is clear that RQH·V
self-­identified commitment to a religion influences political beliefs. This study will control for 
religion in order to assess whether or not it is driving policy preferences more strongly than 
personality.Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) examined the relationship between political 
ideology, personal lifestyles, and implicit preferences. To determine any connection between 
LPSOLFLWSUHIHUHQFHVDQGSROLWLFDOEHOLHIVWKH\FRQVWUXFWHGDVWXG\WRREVHUYHSDUWLFLSDQWV·
                                                                                                                          
8 Beck and Jennings 1991. 
9 Cutler 2003. 
10 Beck and Jennings, 1991. 
11 Layman 1997. 
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SDUWLDOLW\IRUWKHYDOXHVRI´WUDGLWLRQYHUVXVSURJUHVVFRQIRUPLW\YHUVXVUHEHOOLRXVQHVVRUGHU
versus chaos, stability versus fle[LELOLW\DQGWUDGLWLRQDOYDOXHVYHUVXVIHPLQLVPµLQFRPSDULVRQ
to their self-­reported conservatism or liberalism. 12 The study found WKDW´UHVSRQGHQWV·FRJQLWLYH
systems are more ideologically structured than previous generations of sociologists and 
politiFDOVFLHQWLVWVKDYHDVVXPHGµ13 In all five values, preferences clearly predicted political 
orientation. Those who identified as conservative exhibited strong preferences for order over 
chaos and conforming over rebellion, while those who said they were liberal displayed 
inclination toward flexibility over stability and progress over tradition. In other words, this 
exemplified that while liberals possess the system-­justification motive, conservatives are much 
more likely to enthusiastically support system-­justifying attitudes. The study continued by 
analyzing college VWXGHQWV·OLIHVW\OHVLQFRUUHODWLRQWRWKHLUSROLWLFDORULHQWation. Items that the 
authors connected with openness (atheism, tattoos, studying abroad, etc.) were pitted against 
those that reflect traditionalism and resistance to change (Christianity, marriage, 
fraternities/sororities, etc.). The results signified that political ideology strongly constrained 
DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGRWKHUYDULDEOHV/LEHUDOLVPZDVWLHGWRDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRI´QRYHODQGGLIIHUHQW
H[SHULHQFHVµZKLOHFRQVHUYDWLYHSUHIHUHQFHVZHUHPRUH´FRQYHQWLRQDOµDQG´PDLQVWUHDPµ14 In 
addition to expanding upoQSROLWLFDOSV\FKRORJ\·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISHUVRQDOLW\WKHVWXG\
provided a clear example of how personality can be systematically and structurally examined to 
yield significant, useful results. 
Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, and Peterson (2010) took a different approach to the idea of 
personality and political affiliation. Through their studies, they discovered a strong correlation 
EHWZHHQRQH·VLGHRORJLFDOOHDQLQJDQGPRUDOYDOXHV,QWKHILUVWH[DPSOHDPHDVXUHRIWKH%LJ
Five personality traits (openness-­intellect, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism) was utilized to record any particular connections between the two divisions of 
agreeableness (compassion and politeness) and political values.15 The results illustrated that 
those who tended toward liberalism displayed a strong inclination toward compassion while 
those who appeared to be conservative exhibited strong politeness. The researchers explained 
WKLVE\FRQQHFWLQJFRPSDVVLRQWRDOLEHUDO·VGHVLUHIRUHJDOLWDULDQLVPDQGSROLWHQHVVWR a 
                                                                                                                          
12 Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008, 126. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Hirsh et al. 2010. 
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FRQVHUYDWLYH·VZDQWWRPDLQWDLQWKHVWDWXVTXR.16 By discovering another way to prove this 
theory, they further acknowledged the usefulness of personality studies in political science and 
political psychology.  
With these studies in mind, it becomes clear that personality is a segment of political 
psychology that has yet to be fully explored and understood. Indeed, even the basic framework 
of this field incites a need to look at this subject in order to fully comprehend what goes into a 
SHUVRQ·VLGHRORJLFal preferences, particular actions, and overall perceptions of politics as a 
whole. This study steps away from previous research by focusing on the relationship between 
DQLQGLYLGXDO·VSHUVRQDOLW\DVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH0\HUV-­Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and his 
or her political opinions. It asks the question of if the problem-­solving tactics people use in daily 
situations, which the MBTI assessment draws from, are also applied to the political realm. If this 
is the case, are certain types of people predisposed to specific policy opinions over other 
individuals? 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
  To test the relationship between personality and political opinions, I constructed a 
survey that was administered at Illinois Wesleyan University in Bloomington, Illinois. 
Respondents were asked to participate in this voluntary, completely anonymous study. The test 
was divided into four parts, which are detailed below: 
 
Independent Variable: The Myers-­Briggs Typology Indicator 
  Published in 1962, the MBTI sought to test the idea that personality can be easily 
classified into defined, predictable measures. This was done by evaluating how a person views 
the world and comes to decisions about it.17 To categorize these characteristics, the MBTI sorts 
personality into four variables. These variables are mutually exclusive so that subjects will only 
score on one side of the spectrum or the other. In all, there are sixteen possible personality types 
assigned to individuals, expressed in sets of letters (e.g. ENFJ, ISTP, etc.) The letters are 
explained as follows: 
Extraversion (E) vs. Introversion (I): Those who show a preference for Extraversion tend to feel 
comfortable around large groups of people, becoming engaged in social situations and moving 
                                                                                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Myers & Briggs Foundation 2003. 
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to decisions quickly. On the other hand, individuals with an inclination toward Introversion 
enjoy spending time alone and usually think about what they will say or do before they actually 
GRLW7KLVLVHDVLO\VXPPDUL]HGDVRQH·VDSSURDFKWRWKHZRUOG18 
Sensing (S) vs. Intuition (N): This dichotomy analyzes the way information is absorbed. 
Sensing reflects a type of personality in which an individual notices details that are physically 
present DQGUHOHYDQWWRWKH´ERWWRPOLQH.µ  People who display features of Intuition tend to 
enjoy thinking about theories and broad concepts, remembering big events instead of details, 
DQGIRFXVLQJRQWKH´ELJLGHDµ19 
Feeling (F) vs. Thinking (T): This is the primary decision-­making aspect, evaluating what types 
of principles an individual relies on when makiQJFKRLFHV´)HHOHUVµXVXDOO\ZHLJKZKDWRWKHU
people think and how a decision may affect other people. They aim for the choice that will keep 
RUHVWDEOLVKKDUPRQ\DQGZDQWWKHEHVWIRUHYHU\RQHLQYROYHG´7KLQNHUVµKRZHYHUORRNDW
situations along more rational, logic-­based lines. They prefer to be objective and believe that 
what is good for the whole is the most ideal outcome.20  
Judging (J) vs. Perceiving (P): The fourth section assesses how one structures his or her outer 
world and how vital of a factor time is in decision-­making. For those who express a Judging 
personality, time is a strict, inflexible concept, making them highly resistant to change and 
desiring FDUHIXOSODQQLQJRYHUVSRQWDQHRXVFKRLFHV´3HUFHLYHUVµDUHPXFKPRUHRSHQWR
change and flexibility, and in most cases, they prefer it over scheduled activities, waiting to 
make a decision until the last minute so all new information can come to them first.21  
The Test: The MBTI is a forced-­choice instrument, meaning that individuals must answer every 
TXHVWLRQRQWKHDVVHVVPHQWDQGFKRRVHEHWZHHQWKHRSWLRQVRI´\HVµRU´QRµ,Q this variation of 
the test, 72 personality traits are presented in the form of statements, featuring ones such as 
´<RXDUHDOPRVWQHYHUODWHIRUDSSRLQWPHQWVµDQG´<RXWHnd to sympathize with other 
people.µ22 After the results have been scored, participants receive their personality type. Each 
YDULDEOHLVJLYHQD´VWUHQJWKRISUHIHUHQFHµVLJQLILHGE\DQXPHULFDOYDOXHRQDVFDOHRIWR
                                                                                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Humanmetrics 2011. 
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and a nominal value of either a slight, moderate, distinct, or very expressed preference. (See 
Appendix I) 
Dependent Variable: Policy Preferences 
  To determine political preferences, respondents were given a series of perspectives they 
may have about certain political issues. The assessment, developed by Illinois Wesleyan 
8QLYHUVLW\·V'U*UHJ6KDZLQFOXGHGWHQYLHZSRLQWVVL[OLEHUDODQGIRXUFRQVHUYDWLYH In the 
assessment, participants were asked to rank their agreement with each on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 
EHLQJ´VWURQJO\DJUHHµDQGEHLQJ´VWURQJO\GLVDJUHHµ$´QHLWKHUDJUHHQRUGLVDJUHHµRSWLRQ
ZDVDYDLODEOHIRUHYHU\SRVLWLRQ$OWKRXJKXQSXEOLVKHGWKHDQDO\VLV\LHOGHGD&URQEDFK·V
Alpha score of .886, meaning it is a reliable test of political views.23 (Appendix I) 
Control Variable: Intolerance of Ambiguity 
  In 1962, Stanley Budner theorized that individuals typically look at ambiguous 
situations in one of two ways: either as a threat or as desirable. These included situations where 
cues are absent or vague, where there are too many cues, or where cues are not consistent with 
each other.24 In these instances, those with a high tolerance of ambiguity will exhibit risk-­taking 
behaviors, facing these occasions with resiliency and approaching them in an adaptive manner. 
Conversely, those with a low tolerance for ambiguity will show discomfort and anxiety in these 
situations, assessing them along stereotypes and in ´EODFNDQGZKLWHµ manners.25 Because 
intolerance of ambiguity is a different personality variable about decision-­making and has been 
tied to influencing political beliefs, it has been included in this survey as a control variable.26 
The Test: To assess this phenomena, Budner developed a 16-­point test, structured with a series 
RIVWDWHPHQWVWKDWRQHPD\HQFRXQWHULQWKHLUGDLO\OLYHVVXFKDV´$QH[SHUWZKRFDQQRWFRPH
XSZLWKDGHILQLWLYHDQVZHUSUREDEO\GRHVQ·WNQRZPXFKµ´:KDWZHNQRZLVDOZD\V
preferable to what we are noWVXUHRIµHWF3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRUDQNWKHLUDJUHHPHQWZLWK
HDFKRQHRQDVFDOHRIWREHLQJ´VWURQJO\DJUHHµDQGEHLQJ´VWURQJO\GLVDJUHHµ$
´QHLWKHUDJUHHQRUGLVDJUHHµRSWLRQZDV available. (Appendix I) 
                                                                                                                          
23 Shaw, unpublished. 
24 Owen and Sweeney 2002. 
25 Kajs and McCollum 2010.  
26 Jost et al. 2003. 
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Control Variable: Demographic Questions 
  To ensure that respondents were representing the demographics of the university 
properly, as well as to test for several other hypotheses, the survey asked participants to 
respond to several additional questions about themselves. 
Gender: To guarantee that the correct proportion of men and women were surveyed in this 
study, respondents were asked to identify their gender.  
Sociodemographics: Some scholars have suggested that RQH·Vsociodemographic background is 
a reference point for political beliefs.27 For the purposes of testing this claim, respondents were 
DVNHGWRUHFRUGWKHLUIDPLO\·VLQFRPHOHYHODQGWKHLUSDUHQWV·HGXFDWLRQOHYHO 
Religiosity: In addition, religiosity LVJHQHUDOO\EHOLHYHGWRKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQRQH·V
political beliefs.28 ThereforeSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQ´'R\RXFRQVLGHU
\RXUVHOIWREHDUHOLJLRXVSHUVRQ"µZLWK´\HVµ´QRµRU´QRWVXUHµ 
HYPOTHESES 
+µ7KLQNHUVµZLOO KDYHPRUHFRQVHUYDWLYHSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVZKLOH´)HHOHUVµZLOOKDYHPRUHOLEHUDO
ones. 
  %HFDXVHRI7KLQNHUV·WHQGHQF\WRSURFHVVLVVXHVWKURXJKDVHULHVRISUDFWLFDOFDXVH-­and-­
HIIHFWSDWWHUQVWKH\W\SLFDOO\PDNHGHFLVLRQVWKDWLQWKHLURSLQLRQ´PDNHVHQVHµIRUHYHU\ 
LQGLYLGXDOLQYROYHG7KH\GRQRWIHHODQHHGWRDGGUHVVRQH·Vparticular, personal concerns. This 
leads to the idea that they may be less interested in humanitarian, service-­oriented causes that 
focus on caring for an individual than would a Feeler. Feelers are profoundly impacted by 
RWKHUV·VLWXDWLRQVDQGNHHSWKHPLQPLQGZKHQPDNLQJFKRLFHVWKDWFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\DIIHFW
another person. Oftentimes, WKHVHQWLPHQWVRI´WKHZKROHYHUVXVWKHLQGLYLGXDOµ are connected 
with liberalism and conservatism, respectively. However, conservatives emphasize individual 
rights, and their policies reflect the notion that every person is responsible for himself or herself, 
LOOXVWUDWLQJD7KLQNHU·VREMHFWLYHUDWLRQDOPLQGVHW. On the other hand, liberals are typically 
focused on policies that benefit everyone, and this stems from the desire to help each 
LQGLYLGXDO·VSHUVRQDOVLWXDWLRQ7KDWFRQFHSWLVFRQQHFWHGWR)HHOHUV·WKRXJKWSURFHVVHV 
                                                                                                                          
27 Cutler 2003. 
28 Layman 1997. 
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H2: Sensing/Intuition will interact with Thinking/Feeling and influence policy preferences. Sensing-­
Thinkers and Sensing-­Feelers will have more conservative policy preferences, while Intuitive-­Thinkers 
and Intuitive-­Feelers will have more liberal beliefs. 
  Since the Sensing/Intuition component of the MBTI affects how individuals take in 
information from the world around them, it is likely that this will play a pivotal role in policy 
opinions. In each MBTI type, the Feeling/Thinking and Sensing/Intuition factors together serve 
DV´IXQFWLRQVµPHDQLQJWKDWWKH\DUHUHVSRQVLEle for directly processing information and 
coming to conclusions about it.29 As they interact, they tend to elicit certain responses over 
others when merged in one of four ways. While Sensing-­Thinkers approach their world in an 
objective, black-­and-­white style, Intuitive-­Thinkers, although still objective and logical, are 
more open to possibilities and undiscovered applications. Sensing-­Feelers operate in a warm, 
people-­oriented manner that cultivates deep sympathy and care for those around them. While 
Intuitive-­Feelers interact similarly, they are more communicative, open, and adaptive than their 
counterpart.30 Because of that, it appears as though Sensing-­Thinkers represent one end of the 
spectrum with Intuitive-­Feelers on the other. I predict that Sensing-­Thinkers will be more 
strongly conservative than Intuitive-­Thinkers, while Intuitive-­Feelers will be more strongly 
liberal than Sensing-­Feelers. The inflexible, unyielding nature of Sensing-­Thinkers reflects the 
resistance to change that is often typical of conservatives while the flexible, open nature of 
Intuitive-­Feelers connectVWROLEHUDOV·DGDSWDELOLW\WRFKDQJH 
H3: Judgers will be more conservative while Perceivers will be more liberal. 
   Perceivers tend to be more open to general change than Judgers.31  Because of that, it is 
likely that Perceivers will apply that flexibility to their political views, being more receptive to 
ideas that encourage an embracing of change and modifications. On the other hand, Judgers 
will be resistant to these types of policies, turning instead to ones that verify their preconceived 
notions about how the world around them ought to be. Therefore, I predict that the 
Judging/Perceiving function will be the most influential in political opinions. Again, this relates 
to the general resistance to change that many believe to be connected with conservative ideals 
as opposed to liberal ones. 
                                                                                                                          
29 McCauley 1990. 
30 Myers & Briggs Foundation 2003. 
31 McCauley 1990. 
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H4: Extraversion and Introversion will have no effect on policy opinions. 
  As a structure for SHRSOH·V attitudes about the world around them, the 
Extraversion/Introversion factor sets the stage for most of the initial decisions a person makes. 
This sets these two types apart from each other in their initial views of the settings around 
them. But because it impacts an initial reaction with not much critical thinking, rather than the 
decision-­making that follows, I predict that this spectrum will have little to do with political 
opinions. 
H5: Personality type will influence policy preferences more strongly than any control variable 
(intolerance of ambiguity, sociodemographic variables, religiosity). 
  It may be likely that the way one makes political decisions revolves around assessing 
ambiguity, rather than the judgment and choice patterns that are a part of personality. 
However, I predict that intolerance of ambiguity will not be as significant of an influence as 
personality. In fact, it might be the case that personality affects tolerance of ambiguity, which 
then affects policy opinions. If that is true, this provides another way of examining the 
relationship between political beliefs and personal characteristics. Additionally, it has been 
suggested that sociodemographic factors play a role in political decision-­making.32 The 
HGXFDWLRQOHYHORISDUWLFLSDQWV·SDUHQWVDQGWKHLUKRXVHKROGLQFRPHPD\Sredetermine what 
they believe about different political policies. In the continuous overlap between religion and 
politics, it is typically thought that religion serves as a guiding influence in forming opinions 
and choices regarding candidates, platforms, and specific issues.33 3DUWLFLSDQWV·UHOLJLRVLW\PD\
be more influential than the personality factors being tested. However, I predict that personality 
will still prove to be the most significant factor in making political choices. 
LIMITATIONS 
  The aforementioned survey and its related hypotheses face several limitations that are 
imperative to keep in mind while reviewing data results. Because this study is exploratory 
research, it does not have the same depth that a more refined study would. Most of these 
findings and conclusions only scratch at the surface of a connection between the MBTI and 
                                                                                                                          
32 Cutler 2003. 
33 Sigel 1965.  
RES PUBLICA  109 
 
political beliefs. Therefore, while this research does not tell the entire story, it illustrates a 
significant relationship and opens up the possibility of a more concrete correlation. 
  Noticeably, this study revolves around common stereotypes about certain types of 
people, especially when it comes to their political beliefs. For example, not all liberals fit the 
´EOHHGLQJKHDUWOLEHUDOµODEHODQGQRWDOOconservatives are resistant to changes in the world 
around them. The research here seeks to challenge that idea, analyzing whether or not the 
personalities one would expect to correspond with different political views actually do connect. 
  Additionally, it has been found that individuals do not always act on the characteristics 
the MBTI suggests they possess. While people may believe their answer to a question is how 
they would truly respond, others close to them may understand WKDWLQGLYLGXDO·V actual 
behavior differently. It also is the case that certain traits do not function in the ways one would 
assume. For example, those who show a preference for Thinking are not always proficient in 
logical activities, such as mathematics.34 This may partially be due to the fact that, as stated 
earlier in this study, the MBTI is a forced choice instrument, meaning that individuals are asked 
to summarize their behavior into one answer. In limiting responses, it is unclear how strong this 
SHUVRQ·VSUHIHUHQFHIRUWKHRSSRsite function is. For example, one may behave as a Judger in 
some instances and a Perceiver in others.35 
  This study is also limited in its pool of participants. Because the survey was only 
FRQGXFWHGDWRQHXQLYHUVLW\WKHYDULHW\RIUHVSRQGHQWV·GHPRJUDSKic characteristics was 
restricted to who attends the institution. It might be argued that surveying students from the 
same education environment could skew variables being tested. This limits the generalizability 
of these results. The small sample size and narrow assortment of characteristics in this study do 
not capture individuals outside of the university who may possess other traits. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say any of these findings apply across the board.  
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
5HVSRQGHQWV·'HPRJUDSKLFV 
  In this study, 88 students were surveyed. The mean Liberal-­Conservative Index score 
was DSSUR[LPDWHO\$JDLQEHLQJWKDWVLJQLILHGD´SHUIHFWOLEHUDOµDQGD´SHUIHFW
                                                                                                                          
34 Coe 1992. 
35 Ibid. 
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FRQVHUYDWLYHµWKHrespondents in this study leaned slightly liberal. In comparison with self-­
identified political ideology, 29.5% of participants said they were conservative, 44.3% labeled 
themselves as liberal, 21.6% identified themselves as moderate, and 4.5% FKRVHWKH´2WKHUµ
option, which included written-­in UHVSRQVHVVXFKDV´OLEHUWDULDQµ´DSDWKHWLFµDQG
´FRPPXQLVWµof respondents were male, and 55.7% were female. When compared to 
reported values for this university, the distribution was similar. At Illinois Wesleyan University, 
42% of the student body is male, and 58% is female.36 In this regard, these participants are 
representative of the institution as a whole.  
 
+´7KLQNHUVµZLOOKDYHPRUHFRQVHUYDWLYHSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVZKLOH´)HHOHUVµZLOOKDYHPRUHOLEHUDO
ones. 
  Prior to generating results, I hypothesized that Thinking and Feeling would correlate 
with distinctly different political preferences. An interest in particular, personal concerns versus 
an objective desire for equal treatment was the decisive factor that influenced this hypothesis.  
However, after testing this via a bivariate correlation, there is no statistically significant 
relationship. Hypothesis 1 was not confirmed. 
  A possible explanation for this is that since the MBTI is not assessing personal values, 
Feeling and Thinking condenses to simple decision-­making without regard for the motivations 
behind that process. Indeed, a conservative could have the same rationales as a liberal, but 
express them differently when it comes to political opinions. A Feeling conservative could be 
deeply interested in humanitarian and charitable causes but not be concerned with the same 
ones a Feeling liberal might. Moreover, a Thinking liberal could believe his or her ideas are 
JRRGIRUWKHZKROHEXWD7KLQNLQJFRQVHUYDWLYHPD\KDYHDGLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWRIZKDW´JRRGµ
means. Because there is no significant relationship, it is clear that this part of decision-­making is 
not affecting policy preferences. 
H2: Sensing/Intuition will interact with Thinking/Feeling and influence policy preferences. Sensing-­
Thinkers and Sensing-­Feelers will have more conservative policy preferences, while Intuitive-­Thinkers 
and Intuitive-­Feelers will have more liberal beliefs. 
                                                                                                                          
36 Illinois Wesleyan University 2011. 
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  To test this theory, the Sensing/Intuition variable was multiplied by the 
Thinking/Feeling one to analyze whether the resulting interaction significantly affected the 
Liberal-­Conservative Index. It was expected that Sensing-­Thinkers would be more strongly 
conservative than Intuitive-­Thinkers, and that Intuitive-­Feelers would be more strongly liberal 
than Sensing-­Feelers. However, the bivariate correlation shows there is no significant 
relationship. For the interaction variable of Sensing and the Feeling/Thinking component, a p-­
value of 0.118 resulted in its test against the Liberal-­Conservative Index, ruling out a possible 
connection. The Intuitive Feeling/Thinking variable also does not yield a significant 
relationship, with a p-­value of .611 recorded. This leads to the conclusion that when the way 
one takes in information and the way one processes that information are brought together, there 
is not a straight-­forward way it connects to specific political opinions. Hypothesis 2 was not 
confirmed. 
H3: Judgers will be more conservative while Perceivers will be more liberal. 
  Judging and Perceiving revolve around the concepts of change and sensitivity to time. 
While Judging is stricter in these regards, Perceiving is much more open, possibly reflecting 
similar patterns in liberalism and conservatism. To assess this in relation with policy 
preferences, a bivariate correlation was computed. 
  The relationship between the Liberal-­Conservative Index and the Judging/Perceiving 
variable is significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.027), illustrating that there is a connection between 
RQH·VSUHIHUHQFHIRU-XGJLQJRU3HUFHLYLQJDQGhis or her political ideologies. The Pearson 
correlation (0.236) shows WKDWDVRQH·VLQFOLQDWLRQtoward Judging increases, partiality for 
conservatism also increases. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. 
H4: Extraversion and Introversion will have little effect on policy opinions. 
  Because Extraversion and Introversion capture a surface-­level assessment of a situation, 
this hypothesis holds that it will not elicit much of an impact on political beliefs. Since this 
simply focuses on absorbing and analyzing circumstances at a first glance, this phase of the 
decision-­making process involves little critical thinking and therefore is not likely to be 
influential in forming policy opinions. However, the bivariate correlation suggests a different 
theory. 
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  The relationship here is significant at the 0.1 level (p = .079), showing that there is a 
correlation occurring between these two variables. The Pearson correlation of .188 illustrates 
that as one exhibits a stronger preference for Extraversion, he or she also shows a partiality for 
conservative beliefs. If any relationship were to exist here, one would think it would be in the 
opposite direction because Extraversion is characteristic of being open to new occurrences. With 
that, it is not surprising that the relationship, even if significant, is weak. However, given that I 
hypothesized that this variable would have no significant influence, Hypothesis 4 was not 
confirmed. 
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H5: Personality type will influence policy preferences more strongly than any control variable 
(intolerance of ambiguity, sociodemographic variables, religiosity). 
Table 1: The MBTI Personality Types and all control variables 
Dependent Variable: Liberal-­Conservative Index 
Independent Variable Liberal-­
Conservative Index 
Constant 9.428 
(1.076) 
Extraversion-­
Introversion 
.005* 
(.002) 
.164 
Sensing-­Intuition .002 
(.003) 
.050 
Feeling-­Thinking 2.513E-­5 
(.003) 
.001 
Judging-­Perceiving .001 
(.003) 
.031 
Intolerance of 
Ambiguity 
-­.075*** 
(.014) 
-­.482 
3DUHQWV·(GXFDWLRQ
Level 
.024 
(.082) 
.025 
Family Income -­.024 
(.086) 
-­.024 
Religiosity -­.744*** 
(.159) 
-­.383 
N 
Adj. R-­square 
Model Significance 
F-­test 
88 
.457 
.000 
10.061 
Note: Standard error in parentheses and beta weights italicized;; SS**S 
This model explains 45.7% of the variance in the dependent variable. With all control 
variables taken into account, the only significant MBTI personality variable is the 
Extraversion/Introversion factor. As one exhibits an inclination toward Extraversion, he or she 
is more likely to hold conservative beliefs. $VSUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKFRQFOXGHGDVRQH·VWROHUDQFHRI
ambiguity increases, he or she is more likely to support liberal ideologies.37 To further examine 
                                                                                                                          
37 Jost 2003. 
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this, I chose to assess whether or not Intolerance of Ambiguity relates directly with specific 
DUHDVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO·VSHUVRQDOLW\Table 2 presents the bivariate correlations between MBTI 
personality variables and Intolerance of Ambiguity scores.  
Table 2: All personality variables and Intolerance of Ambiguity 
 Extraversion 
and 
Introversion 
Sensing and 
Intuition 
Thinking and 
Feeling 
Judging and 
Perceiving 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.005 
 
-­.271 .134 -­.335 
Significance 
(2-­tailed) 
.966 .011 .214 .001 
N 88 88 88 88 
 
 %XGQHU·VIntolerance of Ambiguity scale shares a significant relationship with the MBTI 
dichotomies of Sensing/Intuition and Judging/Perceiving. This raises the possibility that 
personality is directing Intolerance of Ambiguity which, in turn, affects policy preferences, 
measured by the Liberal-­Conservative Index. For the purposes of assessing this, an interaction 
variable was coded, multiplying Sensing/Intuition values by individual Intolerance of 
Ambiguity scores and doing the same with Judging/Perceiving. A bivariate correlation was 
then computed for each separate interaction variable and compared with the Liberal-­
Conservative Index. 
 For the first bivariate correlation, the Sensing/Intuition variable interacting with 
Intolerance of Ambiguity shows a significant relationship with the Liberal-­Conservative Index. 
With a p-­value of .063, it is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. When added into the 
regression model with all control variables, it remains significant (.10 level) with a p-­value of 
.057. It is therefore possible that personality, in this area, is affecting Intolerance of Ambiguity 
values, which is leading to penchants for certain political views over others. 
 In the second correlation, the Judging/Perceiving interaction variable did not have a 
significant relationship with political opinions. In this case, the p-­value was recorded at .123. It 
is clear, then, that the Judging/Perceiving aspect is not swaying tolerance of ambiguity scores. 
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Religiosity is significant at the 0.001 level, influencing the Liberal-­Conservative Index 
(beta weight = -­.383). The B-­value of -­.744 illustrates that those committed to a particular 
UHOLJLRQDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRKROGFRQVHUYDWLYHYLHZSRLQWV7KLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK/D\PDQ·VRZQ
conclusions about religiosity.38 TKHVRFLRGHPRJUDSKLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRISDUHQWV·HGXFDWLRQOHYHO
and family income were both insignificant in determining political views. This goes against 
previous research that suggested these factors may be influential, but is consistent with my 
expectations.39 
Through multiple regression, it is illustrated WKDW%XGQHU·VIntolerance of Ambiguity 
scale and religiosity are having more of an overall effect on policy opinions than is personality. 
While Extraversion/Introversion still holds some influence, the recorded beta weights suggest it 
is not as impactful as these control variables. Additionally, the previously significant correlation 
between Judging/Perceiving and policy preferences is not significant in the regression model. 
There is a significant interaction between Intolerance of Ambiguity and Sensing/Intuition, 
which holds a significant relationship with policy preferences. This suggests that the way one 
analyzes information affects how he or she assesses ambiguous situations. Consequently, this 
affects policy preferences. But the initial belief that personality would be the most dominant 
factor in RQH·VSROLWLFDORSLQLons does not hold true, and Hypothesis 5 can be rejected. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
Personality is not having as significant of an effect on political views as expected. When 
looking solely at personality factors·bivariate relationships with policy opinions, the 
Judging/Perceiving dichotomy has the strongest correlation with policy preferences, 
illustrating that the way in which one understands time and flexibility affects his or her  
political ideas. After running a multiple regression with all control variables taken into account, 
only Extraversion/Introversion remains a significant predictor of policy preferences. Since this 
study cannot fully explain the implication of the Extraversion/Introversion scale, it suggests 
further research is warranted for this particular variable. 
Furthermore, the interaction between personality and Intolerance of Ambiguity was 
only significant in regard to the Sensing/Intuition variable, suggesting that as an individual 
takes in information, this affects Intolerance of Ambiguity which, in turn, affects political views. 
                                                                                                                          
38 Layman 1997. 
39 Cutler 2003. 
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On its own, Intolerance of Ambiguity had a stronger relationship with political preferences than 
did all MBTI personality variables. Religiosity also accounted for more impact on political 
beliefs than did any other factor aside from Intolerance of Ambiguity, including the 
sociodemographic traits of family incomHDQGSDUHQWV·HGXFDWLRQOHYHO³both of which were not 
significant. Because of this, it would be useful to look at both Intolerance of Ambiguity and 
religiosity more closely. Are there other, undiscovered ways in which these relationships act? 
For religiosity, are different types of people predisposed to religious beliefs? 
After reviewing the limitations of this study and the data that resulted from it, several 
suggestions for further analysis come about. It would be useful to look at the family 
HQYLURQPHQWIDFWRUPRUHFORVHO\H[DPLQLQJSDUHQWV·SROLWLFDOSDUW\LQDGGLWLRQWRHFRQRPLF
background and education level. Moreover, I believe that similar findings will exist in other 
settings outside of this university, but this has not yet been explored. As this study can only be 
generalized to the student population at Illinois Wesleyan University, expanding the survey to 
different locations, age groups, and personal backgrounds would be valuable in looking at 
Myers-­Briggs personality type and political ideas together. 
This study goes beyond previous research by connecting daily decision-­making tactics 
via the MBTI with the political realm and assessing whether or not they coincide.  By observing 
this, it opens a new arena in which policymakers and candidates can use newfound ideas to 
market their positions toward certain types of people. If a legislator is aware that his or her 
stances, proposals, and ideas are more likely to be well received by a certain type of person over 
another, it would be wise to shape discussion and construct information about these things in a 
way that this voter will understand and connect with. In the event these findings become more 
significant with additional research or point to new relationships between personality and 
political views, this could indicate a new way to fuse psychology and politics more actively 
than has been done in the past for the benefit of all participants in these fields. 
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APPENDIX 
Procedure and Coding 
The Myers-­Briggs Typology Indicator 
For the purposes of capturing the breadth of personality, each dichotomy is scored on a scale of 
-­100 to +100, determined by the numerical value related to strength of preference for each 
individual respondent. The first term in each set is the positive value, and the second is the 
negative. 
Policy Opinions 
Responses to those statements regarded to be conservative standpoints had their numerical 
values reversed (7=1, 6=2, etc.). These were then added to the scores of the liberal positions and 
divided by the number of statements, the final result being labeled and referred to here on as 
the Liberal-­Conservative Index. In this, a respondent who scores a 1.00 would be considered a 
´SHUIHFWOLEHUDOµDQGDD´SHUIHFWFRQVHUYDWLYHµ 
Intolerance of Ambiguity 
,QFOXGHGZLWKWKHWHVW%XGQHUFRQVWUXFWHGDPHWKRGRIFDOFXODWLQJRQH·VWROHUDQFHRIDPELJXLW\
from these responses. This involved flipping the answers to certain questions (7=1, 6=2, etc.) 
and adding them together for a total Tolerance of Ambiguity Score. After each participant 
turned in the survey, their responses were calculated through this design and coded as is. 
In the 88 cases involved in this study, the lowest Intolerance of Ambiguity score was 44.0 and 
the highest was 91.0, with a mean of 73.52 and a standard deviation of 8.56. The possible values 
IRUWKLVIDFWRUUDQJHIURPDQGWR$FFRUGLQJWR%XGQHU·VRZQUHVHDUFKUHVSRQGHQWV
tend to fall within the 44.0 to 48.0 range, meaning that subjects in this study had a higher than 
average tolerance of ambiguity.40 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
40 Budner 1962. 
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